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This study is based on a survey over the national identities and attitudes to European integration in the 
ten applicant countries in central and eastern Europe: Estonia, Latvia; Lithuania, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria (CEECs). The dimension of national 
identity, closely connected to the perception of sovereignty, will have a direct bearing of the applicant 
countries' attitudes to European integration and the acceptance of the principles and obligations of EU 
membership by their elite and public. A main conclusion of this study is that because the applicant 
countries' national identities have been forged on the basis of (often) difficult, (sometimes) dramatic, 
historical experiences, and that in many cases the process is far from finalised, it can be expected that 
the identity-dimension will take a special importance in the eastern enlargement of the EU. 
This study also deals with the possible future positions of the CEECs on different aspects of EU 
membership and tries to give a picture of these countries as future member states of the EU. Although 
great caution should be applied when assessing the applicant countries' likely positions, it is 
nevertheless possible to outline some general and specific tendencies. The study covers the following 
areas: EU policies, relations between applicant countries and to countries in the enlarged Union's 
neighbourhood, foreign policy orientation, European security dimension and different aspects of 
European integration, including the Union's institutional structure. 
1. Contemporary national identities in the CEECs 
The investigation into the foundations of the national identities of the CEECs is based on a number of 
consideration including the historical and social experiences of these countries, their subjection to 
more than forty years of Communist domination and the manner in which they decided to form their 
post-communist independence. A common element in the search for a modem national identity in the 
CEECs is their individual identification with Europe. Nevertheless, the nature of this identification 
differs between the countries. For instance, the Polish and Czech people consider themselves as 
always having been part of mainstream Europe and having contributed to its development. Joining the 
EU is, therefore, seen as being synonymous with regaining their (historically) rightful position in 
Europe, a feeling shared by the Hungarian population. Similarly, the Romanian national identity is 
closely associated with the feeling of the country being a 'great European' nation, not because 
Romanians necessarily see their country as a future big member state of the Union, but rather because 
of the resolute identification of Romanian national identity with European culture. 
By contrast, national identity in the Baltic States is, in many ways, connected to the survival of the 
independent state. As such, EU membership is viewed as part of a series of linkages to the western 
world considered necessary to ensure the continuation of their national independence. An emphasis on 
the question of independence can also be seen in the case of Slovakia, where the persistent subjection 
of the people to the political domination of a number of neighbouring countries has led national 
identity to be defined in terms of opposition to the outside world. In Bulgaria, the process of getting to 
grips with the obligations of EU membership and their possible impact on the society is still in an 
early phase. A strong popular sense of national identity and the importance of an independent foreign 
policy among the elite are two elements of particular salience in Bulgaria. In Slovenia, on the other 
hand, escaping from Yugoslavia and Communism is held to be synonymous with fleeing to the West. 
As the independence movement was stepped up in the end of the 1980s, a much higher value was 




















Survey of National Identity 
2. Possible future positions of the CEECs 
2.1 Priorities for EU Policies based on Hopes for Economic and Security 
Gains 
Policy domains where continued Community involvement is considered imperative are the 
single market, monetary union, cohesion policy and structural funds, military security, the 
CFSP, free movement of people, police co-operation and immigration management within the 
domain of justice and home affairs. These are areas that are expected to provide further 
economic modernisation or even economic gains (single market, Euro, EU funds), "hard" 
security (military co-operation and the CFSP) and "soft" security gains (justice and home 
affairs), and which respond to the immediate needs of these countries. It is noteworthy that all 
applicant countries seem to attach little importance to the EU's development policy. 
2.2 Relations between the CEECs 
The relations between the CEECs have at times been cool mainly due to ethnic minorities or 
due to specific events, like the partition Czechoslovakia. The conclusion of a number of 
bilateral friendship and co-operation agreements has, however, generally improved the 
relations between them. Despite the sometimes clouded relations, the applicant countries are 
in general positive towards the accession of each other to the EU. Political and historical 
experiences shape the intensity with which the CEECs desire other applicant countries to 
become members. 
2.3 Foreign Policy Orientation and Relations to the European 
Neighbourhood 
The global priorities of the CEECs give reason to think that the accession of these ten 
countries is likely to reinforce the EU's attention both eastwards and westwards. In the world, 
the applicant countries are extremely focused in their attention on the US, that can provide 
both security and economic gains as well as political global leadership, and on other important 
economic actors such as Japan, South East Asia, China and, to a certain extent, India. 
Across the board, poorer regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the Pacific, the Caribbean and 
Central America, are not considered to be important. The firm emphasis of the CEECs on rich 
and politically powerful regions and potential trade partners mirrors the importance which the 
CEECs attach to economic progress and potential gains, and the low interest in the EU's 
development policy. 
With respect to the enlarged Union's immediate neighbours, it is clear that the accession of 
the ten CEECs reinforces the attention eastwards and southeastwards, reflecting geopolitical 
and economic concerns in these countries. All the applicant countries attach great importance 
to the relations to Russia and the Ukraine. In this respect, it is interesting to note that several 
CEECs would support EU membership to the Ukraine. They are more reluctant towards 
Russia becoming member of the EU, and Latvia and Estonia would even oppose such as step. 
The republics of CIS are considered a foreign policy priority in Poland, the Baltic States, 
Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. Turkey constitutes a high priority for Slovakia 
and Bulgaria, and is considered important in several other CEECs, but without earning their 
support for a future Turkish EU membership. The applicant countries generally give the Black 
Sea/Caucasus, the Near East, and the Maghreb little importance, with the exception for 
Bulgaria and Romania which consider the first region very important. Similarly, the Near 
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2.4 The European Security Dimension 
Military security and stable, peaceful relations with European neighbours feature as one of the 
primary reasons why the CEECs wish to become members of the EU. However, the implicit 
security guarantee, or "security bonus", that the EU can offer, is generally not considered 
sufficient. Rather, in terms of security and stability, EU membership is part of a broader quest 
where membership in NATO is the primary aim. The notion that NATO is the primary 
guarantor of security and stability is indicative of the strong emphasis within the CEECs on 
the transatlantic dimension of the European security structure. European security is viewed as 
intimately connected with the continued commitment and involvement of the US and the 
preservation of the transatlantic security community. 
2.5 European Integration and the EU's Institutional Structure 
The entry of the CEECs will tip the internal balance towards small member states which will 
probably favour the possibility to retain the veto on questions of vital national interest - a 
position in line with their quite vocal fear of erosion of national sovereignty inside the EU. 
The basic instinct of the CEECs is of an intergovernmental character, not because they do not 
support integration, but simply because this is the form of co-operation they know best. 
Previous experiences of inter-state relations have often been based in coercion and forced 
assimilation. 
The question of national identity is expected to have crucial role in the eastward enlargement 
of the EU: 
• The national identities of the CEECs developed late compared to western Europe due to 
past and recent historical experiences. In the beginning of the 1990s, national identity was 
used as a means to justify the right to independent statehood and sovereignty. 
• National identity as formulated in the early 1990s was composed by a strong identification 
with 'Europe' as belonging to 'Europe' meant breaking with the Communist past. 
• The social, economic and institutional reforms necessary for a correct adoption of the EU 
acquis is staking out the direction of the CEECs' modernisation process, and in many ways 
reshaping their societies. 
• Many of the CEECs see themselves as small countries, vulnerable to external dominance 









































This study is based on the replies to a survey sent to the Commission's delegations in the ten applicant 
countries in central and eastern Europe (CEE): Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria. It has also relied on the Eurobarometer surveys 
of March 1997 and 1998 and academic sources. 1 In order to facilitate the reading of this report no 
specific references will be made, unless the argument forwarded merits a specific mentioning of its 
source. 
The objective of the survey is to highlight possible future positions and attitudes of the CEECs 
towards the EU, its policies, relations with third countries, position on the global scene and its future 
institutional development. The study is based on the argument that the nature of these countries' 
evolving national identities will be a determining factor for their future participation in the European 
integration process and will be crucial for their societies' acceptance of its aims. Since the study 
attempts to give a multi-dimensional picture of the ten CEECs as possible future EU members, its 
wide scope makes it impossible at times to avoid generalisations and broad tendencies at the expense 
of national specificity. Nevertheless, the countries have been treated in specific sections and their 
particular views pointed out in order to capture the differences between them. More difficult 
dimensions of European integration (for instance, its institutional development) do not permit a clear-
cut analysis of country positions for the simple reason that the thinking on these questions is still at an 
early stage in most CEECs. 
The report is organised in three main sections. The first section deals with the historical context in 
which the CEECs' national identities have been formed. The second section deals with the 
contemporary situation (the process of democratisation and economic and social transition) by 
illustrating briefly the main tendencies in CEECs' political and democratic development, and by 
giving an account of the national identities as they are evolving in CEE. The third section analyses the 
possible future positions of the CEECs on EU policies, neighbourhood area, foreign policy orientation 
and their likely attitudes towards the Union's future institutional development. Finally, the report 
concludes by highlighting some implications of the analysis of the CEECs' possible future positions 
and attitudes and offers some tentative recommendations. 
1 Study commissioned by the European Commission, 'Democratisation in Central and Eastern European Countries' by 
Sussex European Institute, final report and country reports; Henry Bogdan, Histoire des pays de I 'Est: Des origines a nos 
jours, Hachette, Pluriel, 1994; Roumen Daskalov, Building up a National Identity: The Case of Bulgaria, EU! Working 
Papers SPS, No. 94/11, 1994; Norman Davies, Europe: A History, Oxford University Press, 1996; Cathrine Duradin, 
Histoire de la nation roumaine. Edition Complex, 1994; Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and the Path to Independence, Yale University Press, 1994; Piotr S. Wandycz, The Price of Freedom: A History of East 







































2. National Identity, the State and the Nation 
2.1 The Foundations for National Identity 
When enquiring into the foundations of the national identities of the ten CEECs, the first consideration 
is an obvious, though not less important, one: the national identities of these countries differ in nature 
and are founded on very different historical and social experiences. In some cases, like Poland, 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Lithuania, national identity has evolved over time traceable to a certain ethnic 
group occupying a well-defined territory (although the boundaries of all four countries changed greatly 
over time) and subjected to a centralising force, be it a king, princes or other forms of political 
organisation. In other cases, like Romania and Slovakia, national identity must be seen as a modem 
phenomenon, superimposed on regional traditions and cultures, in no way less decisive for later 
expressions of national identity, but not tied to any clearly defined territory or associated with any 
centralising forces before the 191h century. Multi-ethnicity, as one of the distinct characteristics of 
CEE, has not hindered the emergence of a national identity, but has sometimes rendered the debate 
over concepts like citizenship (as distinct from nationality) crucial for the process of nation-building. 
A second consideration to be taken into account is the differing degrees to which these countries have 
been part of mainstream European events and religious, cultural, philosophical and political 
developments. 
A third consideration is linked to the position of the CEECs in relation to dominant European or non-
European powers which has been influential in the shaping of their national identities. 
A fourth consideration is the experience of more than forty years of Communist domination to which 
all ten countries were subject, but nonetheless took different forms and influenced their political, 
economic and societal developments in different ways. 
A fifth consideration is the way in which the ten countries decided to form their post-communist 
independence, the process of economic and social transition, the nature of the democratic system and the 
desire to complete their rediscovered nation/statehood and how it has shaped their modem national identity. 
2.2 The Nature of Statehood: A Historical Comparison 
A distinct characteristic of CEE is the difficult and in some cases recent (in comparison to western 
Europe) process of state-building. Some historians2 have even put forward the argument that it was the 
interruption of statehood in a historical perspective that prohibited the process of nations forming along 
western lines. The result was the evolution of a different concept of nationhood, coloured by a romantic 
outlook and conceived in terms of ethnicity and cultural-linguistic criteria. The nationalist era of the 191h 
century that led to an intense nation-state-building process in western Europe also had its effect on the 
countries of CEE, all of which saw the revival or emergence of national movements during this period. 
2.2.1 In the Northeast 
Poland and Lithuania saw their centuries-old commonwealth 'of two nations' break up at the very end 
of the 181h century, largely due to Prussian and Russian territorial interests. The Lithuanian Duchy was 
in large parts absorbed by the Russian Empire in the early 19th century, while the Polish lands were 
divided between the Prussian, Austrian and Russian Empires. Throughout the 191h century both nations 
succeeded in maintaining their cultural specificity and sense of national identity. Lithuania, by a 
combination of the multi-cultural character of its elite (partly of Polish and Jewish origins) nurturing 
the aspect of its capital's, 
2 See, for instance Piotr S. Wandycz, The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the 
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Vilnius, character of a true cultural crossroads, and an independent Lithuanian and Ruthenian 
peasantry. In the inter-war period, Lithuania experienced a period of national independence from 1918 
-1940, but was marred by an authoritarian regime in the period between 1929-1940. Lithuania has 
been characterised as a nationalist, one-party state during this period. 3 
The Polish people defended doggedly their identity during 200 years of foreign dominance, most 
conspicuously through a number of uprisings against the foreign rulers which each time was forcefully 
quelled with additional loss of land. Under the influence of the ideals of the French revolution, the 
Polish nationalist movement during the 19th century inspired several violent revolts against tsarist 
Russia with a great loss of human lives, including mass deportations to Siberia. The national idea was 
kept alive throughout the 19111 century in a fashion that had little to do with economic or social 
thinking, but was closely linked to the will to preserve culture, identity and honour. At the end of the 
First World War, Poland's independence was not confirmed until after the end of the war with Russia 
in 1920 which left the Polish army with a high degree of popular prestige and political influence. 
Independent Poland's political system moved from a weak parliamentary regime to a left-wing 
military (authoritarian) regime with a parliamentary appearance after a coup d'etat by Marshal 
Pilsudski. 
Estonia and Latvia were since Medieval times under the rule of the Teutonic Knights and later under 
the influence ( or direct rule) of Russian, Polish-Lithuanian or Scandinavian rulers. In 1721, Estonia 
and Latvia were annexed to the Russian Empire. The struggle against foreign influence was in fact 
directed not so much against the Russians as against the Baltic German nobility, whose control over 
the local administration had been guaranteed by the Tsar. Both countries proclaimed independence in 
1918 and established democratic regimes with a bias towards the legislative at the expense of the 
executive. The parliamentary regimes succumbed to authoritarian leaderships in 1934 largely due to 
the general perception that the parliaments had acquired too much power and were expediently 
dissolved. The period of independent statehood between the two world wars has come to form an 
important part of national mythology in all three Baltic countries and was made a point of reference 
for the contemporary process of independence and statehood. 
2.2.2 Under the Influence of the Former Habsburg Empire 
The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary have in common their close bonds to the rule of 
the Habsburgs under different forms: the Habsburg Empire, Austrian Empire or the Dual Monarchy of 
Austria and Hungary. Throughout history, the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia were in close 
contact with developments in western Europe, and experienced a period of industrialisation parallel 
and comparable to that of western Europe. On the other hand, the awakening of the Czech national 
movement in the 191h century led to the formulation of a Slav identity in opposition to the dominant 
position of German culture and the high degree of germanisation of the Czech elite. In contrast to 
Poland, there was no politically organised nation to which nationalists could refer; instead, education 
and the economic sector permitted the emergence of a self-aware Czech middle-class. 
Slovakia had an even weaker basis on which to forge national identity, and being subject to strong 
Hungarian influence resorted to a strong Slav identification. Hungary recognised with difficulty the 
desire of the Slovaks to identify themselves as a nation with a potential political future and persisted in 
regarding them as Slavs of Upper Hungary. A Czechoslovakian state was proclaimed in 1918, which 
took on distinct democratic features but was characterised by Czech dominance in political, 
administrative and economic domains. 
Slovenia belonged to the Habsburg monarchy from the 13th century and enjoyed a quite high degree of 
cultural independence. Like many other countries in Europe, the 191h century saw the birth of a 
Slovene national movement that was instrumental in creating a distinct Slovene language. In 
developing a separate language, Slovenia took a separate road, different from that of its neighbour 
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Croatia whose language was developed in conjunction with the Serb language. Slovenia chose to join 
the Monarchy of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after the First World War, but came to resent Serb 
dominance particularly under the authoritarian rule of the Yugoslav Kingdom in 1929. 
The Hungarians claim a distinct ethnic background as descendants of the Magyar people that settled in 
the Carpathian basin in the 9th century. With the declining influence of Byzantium, the dominance of 
the Hungarian Kingdom (including Transylvania and Upper Hungary - today's Slovakia) spread far 
into neighbouring regions, Croatia, Bosnia and Dalmatia, which took on the character of a loosely-
held-together, multi-ethnic political structure. The advance of the Turks resulted in the partition of 
Hungary (a third came under Habsburg rule, while more than one-third came under Turkish 
dominance and the remaining territory of Transylvania became independent), which lasted for 150 
years. After having repelled the Turks, the Hungarians lived uneasily under Habsburg dominance 
giving rise to a strong Hungarian national movement in the 19th century that led to the uprisings in 
1848-49. The link between the two nations continued on a more equal basis after the establishment of 
the Dual Monarchy of 1867, which also saw a period of strong drive of 'magyarisation' of 
neighbouring peoples. For the national idea of Hungary, the Trianon Treaty of 1920 was a disaster 
granting it full independence but with a loss of two-thirds of its territory and three-fifths of its 
population. The Trianon Treaty still colours people's perceptions of 'always being on the losing side' 
in European conflicts. The Hungarian inter-war period was turbulent with a short spell of a Soviet 
Communist Republic followed by a long period of a quasi-democratic, authoritarian regime. 
2.2.3 In the Southeast 
Bulgaria's national identity was forged under centuries of opposition or struggle against foreign 
dominance. Descendants of the marriage between Slav tribes and a semi-nomadic tribe of Turkic 
origin, the first and second Bulgarian kingdoms stood in constant political rivalry to the Byzantine 
Empire, including a spell of Byzantine dominance. The second foreign dominance commenced in 
1366 with an almost five century long period as a province of the Ottoman Empire. The independence 
of the Bulgarian State in 1878 was confirmed after the Russian-Turkish war, but at the price of a 
considerable loss of territory. In forming their national identity, Bulgarians stressed the differences in 
religion, culture and tradition in relation to their Ottoman rulers, but the influence of Turkish Oriental 
culture left an enduring trace on the Bulgarian culture, in particular in domestic life, tastes and mental 
attitudes.4 In 1922, independent Bulgaria experienced a military coup d'etat, followed by an 
authoritarian regime and dissolution of the opposition. Attempts to restore parliamentarism were 
interrupted by frequent states of emergency or military take-overs. 
Romania formed around the Latin-speaking Christian principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia. During 
the Middle Ages, before the time of a common political entity, Byzantium was the main source of 
influence. It had a noticeable impact on the social structure composed of a landed elite and an 
(under)developed peasantry. The principalities put up resistance against the Ottoman advances, but by 
the end of the 15th century they were incorporated into the Empire. In the first phase of Turkish 
dominance, the sultan proved to be a tolerant master and left a great deal of independence to the 
Romanian princes to conduct domestic affairs. In this period, both principalities experienced a cultural 
and religious renaissance. Romanian national identity did not, however, attract any interest before the 
emergence of national movements in the 191h century which campaigned for an independent Romanian 
state. The first step was the unification of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1859, confirmed in 1878 after 
the Russian-Turkish war, but Romanian nationalists also campaigned for the idea of reuniting 
Romanians in Transylvania and Bessarabia (Moldova) with the heartlands. The national idea was then 
based on the Romanian people's links to the Greek and Roman civilisations and its most important 
expression was the gradual modernisation and 'latinisation' of the Roman language. After the First 
World War, the enlargement of the Romanian territory and the emergence of 'Greater Romania' was 
accompanied by an unstable, sometimes violent, parliamentary regime, which was consequently 
replaced by a royal dictatorship after a coup d'etat in 1920. 
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2.3 The Influence of the Communist Experience on National Identity 
After the Second World War, the ten CEECs gradually came under Communist influence. Only in the 
case of Slovenia, did the influence not come from the Soviet Union, but in shape of the Stalinist-
inspired Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia under the dictatorship of General Tito. The 
Communist regime under Tito was able to pursue an independent line towards Moscow due to the 
Yugoslav resistance during the war against the Germans. The Tito-regime did not favour collectivised 
agriculture and allowed workers' self-management, two elements that helped to retain an 
entrepreneurial spirit and private economic activities. Although there was a conscious drive towards 
the creation of a Yugoslav-identity, the effectiveness of these efforts must be questioned in view of the 
violent break-up of Yugoslavia. The war in the former Yugoslavia shows on the contrary that 
traditional tensions between the different republics had been kept alive and even fuelled by increasing 
regional social and economic discrepancies under the Communist leadership. 
In the case of the Baltic States, the Soviet dominance was total in the sense that these countries were 
incorporated as republics in the Soviet Union, although the repression took slightly different forms in 
Lithuania compared to Latvia and Estonia. The impact of the Soviet period on these countries' 
economic, social and political life was profound, since all considerations related to these areas were 
henceforth totally subjugated to the needs and desires of the Communist leadership in Moscow. The 
penetration of the dual system of the Communist party-state was total and succeeded in wiping out all 
traces of historical or inter-war experiences of self-organisation and political independence. The 
organisation of economic activities was geared towards Moscow with the result that infrastructure of 
all kinds was built to be compatible to the needs defined centrally, but not to sustain any economic or 
social exchanges between the Baltic republics. The fifty years of Soviet dominance also entailed a 
conscious effort to destroy the social fabric of the Baltic societies. The two most conspicuous 
phenomena of this kind were, on the one hand, the substantial reduction of the ethnic Baltic population 
during and after the second world war through the loss of lives and emigration and, on the other hand, 
the intense process of 'Russification' of the population in Latvia and Estonia, mainly by way of 
deportations of Balts and settlements of Russians. Today, Russians make up 28% of the population in 
Estonia and 30% in Latvia. The experience of Lithuania under the Communist period is a bit different 
since it avoided the large scale industrialisation of the kind that the other two republics were subjected 
to and was, therefore, not exposed to immigration of Russian workers to the same extent as them. 
Consequently, Lithuania is today populated by 8% Russians and 9% Poles. The presence of large 
Russian minorities, the geographical closeness to Russia and the 201h century social and political 
experiences explain why the Baltic state-building process after the declaration of independence in 
1991 has been set in terms of the 'survival of the nation' and the preservation of national identity ( as 
opposed to alien identities). 
Hungary, Poland, and to a certain extent Czechoslovakia proved recalcitrant members of the Soviet 
sphere. Although uprisings against Soviet dominance in 1956, 1968 and in the 1980s were forcefully 
quelled, they served to keep the dream of liberty and self-governance alive. In Hungary, contemporary 
public perceptions of politics are largely influenced by a combination of the brutal repression of the 
1956 uprising and recent historical experiences gained in the Kadar era (1956-89) which provided 
limited political and economic freedoms. The Prague Spring of 1968 received more western media 
attention than the Hungarian revolt, even though the latter had cost many more lives. It put the 
communist dominated countries' struggle for national independence on the consciousness of the 
western public. The period of 'normalisation' which followed effectively put a lid on the 'national 
awakening' and freedom movement by reintroducing a hard-line Soviet regime. However, some 
political dissidents remained active in Czechoslovakia during the 1970s and 1980s, mostly associated 
with the 'Charter 77' declaration of which a prominent leader was the current Czech president, Vaclav 
Havel. Over forty years of Conmmnist dominance had probably less effect on the Polish society than 
on neighbouring countries; both structurally and psychologically Poland (along with Hungary) was the 
least sovietised country in the Warsaw Pact. Several explanations may be put forward: the Polish 
agriculture and farming community had resisted collectivisation; its intelligentsia had largely avoided 
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foreign dominance, played a vital role in preserving national identity and spirit during the Communist 
era. The Church as the only institution tolerated by the regime, but which also sustained criticism 
against Communism, assisted the Polish population to rise in a mass-protest against the Communist 
system after the freedom movement had been set in motion in the 1980s by the Solidarity trade union. 
The resistance of the Church reinforced the deep historical attachment of the Polish population to 
national identity and religious values, and the close links between the two. 
Bulgaria's experience under Communism was characterised by the strong attachment to a pro-Soviet 
course on the part of Bulgarian national leaders. After an initial violent suppression and a 
demonisation campaign of pre-war Bulgarian national Communist heroes, the regime adopted a 
milder, more clientilistic form of repression. The regime, however, remained socially and 
economically immobile and destroyed effectively all forms of civil self-organisation or activities. 
Romania's post-war experience is characterised by the 25-year-long neo-Stalinist dictatorship under 
Ceausescu that subsequently also acquired a nationalist inclination. The nationalist character of the 
regime found its expression in the individual line towards Moscow and in the forced assimilation of 
the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. On national minorities, however, the Ceausescu regime 
proved capable of mounting a dual policy which on the one hand counted on the support of these 
minorities by granting them certain rights (e.g. to use their language) while on the other hand set up 
structures to assimilate them into the Romanian state. Romanian society, however, emerged 
fragmented after years of social engineering orchestrated by the regime. The infiltration of the security 
police and its grip on society was strong; it has been estimated that one in seven Romanians operated 
in one form or the other for the Securitate, while four million out of fourteen million adult Romanians 
were members of the Communist party. Moreover, private property had been almost totally 
nationalised. The totalitarian project in Romania was probably more complete than anywhere else in 








































3. An Emerging Idea of Europe: The Process of State-
building and evolving national identities 
Contemporary national identity in the CEECs has been deeply coloured by the breakaway from 
Communist dominance and the ensuing economic, social and democratic transition process. In all 
countries, the dream of the western world acted as a driving force for freedom; for some people it 
incarnated the idea of basic freedoms and democracy, for others a higher standard of living and access 
to western goods and tastes. The post-Communist life turned out to be different and definitely much 
tougher than expected. Transition laid a heavy burden on the populations, many of which today still 
have to endure harsher living conditions and a much higher degree of insecurity than under the 
previous regime. Independence meant freedom, but also responsibility of independent government and 
the difficult task of managing economic and democratic transition. The hardship to which ordinary 
people were exposed made some of them mis the predictability and the perceived order of the old 
system, while others grew suspicious of politics and new democratic institutions. 
3.1 Some General Developments in the Democratisation Process 
Some general developments in the process of democratisation in the CEECs are worth mentioning. 
Measured in formal and procedural terms, transition from authoritarian to democratic forms of 
government has been largely successful in all CEECs. The basic criteria of democracy are fulfilled 
in almost all CEECs: Government rests on the rule of law and is characterised by a separation of 
powers; power-holders are elected through free and fair elections; human rights and the freedom of 
expression and organisation are respected; and minorities are respected and protected. The situation is 
in constant state of flux, however, and the quality of democratic principles may vary over time. For 
instance, the Commission draw the attention in its opinions of 1997 to the situation concerning the 
rights of minorities in most CEECs and criticised the current Slovak government on several accounts 
(separation of powers, access to parliamentary bodies for the opposition, interference in the judicial 
system, media involvement etc.). 
Many delegations pointed out the quite negative connotations of the concept of 'politics' stemming 
both from the perception from the time of the Communist regimes when 'politics' was used to 
characterise the non-transparent way that the political leadership ran the country, and from the 
disillusionment with the way in which democracy has functioned in the CEECs since their 
independence. The negative image of contemporary politics can partly be attributed to varying 
difficulties in the reform process, bickering between political parties and individual politicians and the 
behaviour of some national politicians, including personal enrichment. Partly, it can be attributed to 
the very high (unrealistic) expectations on behalf of the public as to the capacity of the newly 
independent republics to deliver in terms of improved living standards and a brighter, problem-free 
future. Despite the fact that ordinary people have become quite critical of the way in which democracy 
works, they do not reject democracy as such and the lack of faith in democracy and politics has not 
reached a crisis point. 
A weak element in the democratisation process is the role of the political parties which have as 
yet to reflect socio-economic cleavages and ensure programmatic political debate. In many cases, 
political parties are still highly polarised on anti-Communist and/or nationalist lines or are difficult to 
distinguish according to western ideological terms, since most of them sign up to a market-based 
economy, social justice and joining the EU. Membership in new political parties is still low, largely 
due to a general feeling of apathy and the experience of forced membership of the Communist party. 
Consequently, only the (reformed) Communist parties can rely on a functioning party machine and (in 
some countries) a stable group of faithful voters. The trend of a weak party system and dissatisfaction 
with the way democracy works helps to explain the emergence of a number of phenomena: the 
formation of many political parties around strong personalities; stronger interest and often higher trust 
in the presidential office than in parliament itself; and the decreasing turn-out in parliamentary 




















Survey of National Identity 
While the transition has entailed a transformation of the political and economic systems, the state has 
largely remained centralised, paternalistic, and clientilistic.5 The clientilistic marriage between the 
party and the state under Communism has been replaced by a similar clientilistic relationship between 
the ruling elite and the public administration. The state as a neutral administration serving the public is 
in many ways still a chimera, and this has not helped to reduce the already ingrained unease that 
citizens are experiencing in their contacts with state institutions. Similarly, despite far-reaching 
privatisation, the state remains entangled in the economy and the relationship is generally more 
complex and opaque than severed. The interdependence between the state, financial institutions, and 
industrial conglomerates is still substantial in many CEECs. In Slovakia, for instance, the population is 
disenchanted with the clientilistic economic system, but is at the same time ( according to opinion 
polls) asking for an increased role of the state in economic matters. There is a growing pessimism 
towards the currently used political methods, with deterioration of the credibility of western 
democratic values and in the image of pluralistic societies as the consequence. 
The prospect of EU membership has highlighted the need for administrative reform and 
decentralisation of central state government. Poland and Hungary, for instance, are making 
progress towards a reformed system of regional governance which could in time and with proper 
funding act as a counterbalance to the central state as well as increasing ordinary people's feeling of 
being able to influence regional policies. 
With few exceptions, over four decades of Communist totalitarianism completely eradicated the 
different forms of civil society that existed in the CEECs before the Second World War and kept the 
lid tight on independent popular movements. In the 1980s, autonomous civic groups emerged in 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, and paved the way for the 1989 revolutions in 
these countries, while in the other CEECs the totalitarian control over all associational life remained 
solid. At the end of the 1980s, most CEECs were experiencing an emergence of political resistance 
and one-issue interest groups (such as the ecological movement) which pushed for the dramatic 
changes in 1989 or beginning of the 1990s. Some of these groups were reformed as political parties or 
continued their quest for ensuring political, social and democratic rights. On the whole, however, civil 
society in the CEECs must still be characterised as weak, particularly in terms of political 
influence. Part of the explanation for this may be found in the worsened standard of living which has 
forced people to fight for their daily living rather than pursue political ideals, part of it may be 
attributed to the disillusionment with the way that the democratic system works paralleled by a 
stronger will to realise materialistic dreams rather than political/democratic ideals. An additional 
important factor is the absence of a genuine middle-class, which in some CEECs is partly a historical 
fact, but was negatively influenced during the Communist period in all CEECs. The transformation 
process has showed that time is needed to create a viable middle-class, and that this development is 
dependent on several factors: improved socio-economic situation, democratic and political reforms 
and reforms of a judicial nature ( e.g. land reform and settlement of property rights). 
Media has been liberalised to varying degrees in all the CEECs, but government control or 
influence is still common. The overwhelming domination of broadcast media compared to print 
media gives cause for some concern. With respect to the media's coverage of the EU in the CEECs, 
the language is generally neutral or positive. Specialised journalists covering the EU have a good 
understanding of the European institutions and political process of the EU, while the knowledge about 
the EU on the part of non-specialised journalists leaves much to be desired. 
5 In Romania, the state is still highly centralised, and until the fall of the Iliescu-regime, it chose to concentrate its resources 
in other fields rather than in the management of economic reform. In other countries, the prevailing strength and 
centralisation of the state is accompanied by a paternalistic mode of governance. In the Baltic states, more than four 
decades under Soviet rule has left the legacy of "democratic centralism" deeply entrenched, and perhaps harder to do away 
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3.2 The Nature of Contemporary National Identity. 
The early independence movements put a great stress on historical events, personalities, symbols and 
attributes, partly as a means to rediscover the roots of past belongings, partly as a way to construct an 
identity devoid of any attachment to the Communist era. The quest for adhering to western 
organisations and political entities became an important anchor for the modernisation of the CEECs' 
societies while the right to one day belong to them was frequently stressed by underlining their 
historical belonging to European/western civilisation and attachment to its values. 
The search for a modem national identity matching the different CEECs' aspirations and characteristic was 
found in a combination of their historical past, the experiences of the 201h century, geographical position, 
ethnic composition and cultural heritage. Their individual identification with Europe is part of this process. 
Although all ten CEECs identify themselves as Europeans (as they indeed are), there is a striking 
difference between those who see themselves as always having been part of the mainstream European 
evolution and having made a considerable contribution to European society throughout history, and 
those which were either cut off periodically from Europe or were permanently subject to foreign 
dominance. The former group, as they applied for EU membership, saw themselves as reclaiming a 
central position in Europe denied to them due to a great historical aberration. 
3.2.1 The Central Europeans 
For the Polish people the notion of historic traditions, national sovereignty and identity is very 
important as they have been able to preserve a strong attachment to these values throughout the stormy 
history of the last 200 years. The constant remodelling of Poland has deeply coloured its perception of 
notions such as state, nation and borders. The fact that Poland has managed to survive, despite being 
sometimes close to extinction in historical times, has nurtured a feeling that the nation can persist 
without a well-defined territorial area or state-like framework. In this respect, the role of the Catholic 
Church has been essential in that it has provided a focal point for national identity in times when the 
Polish territory and political system have been under constant change. This explains the close 
connection between national identity and Christian values in large parts of the Polish society. Poles 
also consider themselves as having always been part of mainstream Europe and having contributed to 
its development. In this sense, joining the EU is seen as a confirmation of the European vocation of the 
Polish population and of the country's natural position in Europe. The delegation in Warsaw pointed 
out that in order to counter underlying fears that European integration could undermine national 
sovereignty and dilute national identity, a conscious effort should be made to explain that the notion of 
European identity exists in parallel to national identities and that the former is not intended to infringe 
upon cultural diversity or national specificity. Nonetheless, the fear oflosing national identity has been 
seized upon by conservative Christian groups, such as the one around Radio Macyja ( 4 million 
listeners), which have tried to depict European integration as a process dangerous for the traditional 
role of the family, leading to a permissive society and a secularisation of life in general. These 
movements concentrate in particular on questions such as divorce and abortion. 
Among the CEECs, Poland is the only country that undeniably sees itself as a future 'big' member state 
of the EU. Similarly, Poland sees itself as a big country in its region with a special mission to take the 
lead among its eastern neighbours. From this perception stems the notion of a Polish 'Ostpolitik'. 
The Czech national identity is based on a feeling of a historical belonging to mainstream European 
developments: geographically it occupies a central position in Europe and economically it used to be 
an integrated and dynamic part of Europe. National identity under the Klaus-regime was deliberately 
constructed on a perception that the Czech Republic was more advanced than other CEECs in terms of 
macro-economic performance and political stability, presented as a natural continuation of its inter-
war experience. This perception is reportedly shared by approximately half the population and co-
exists together with a sense of distrust concerning the historical role of the republic in relation to 
Germany and Poland. Sometimes arguments are raised about the dangers involved in joining the EU, 
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Czechs have, in general, a wider concept of Europe than one confined to the existing EU, and the 
establishment is more in favour of a Euro-Atlantic concept of co-operation than of the notion of 
European integration as a political project. 
The national identity of Hungary is based on a strong historical attachment to the Hungarians' 
thousand-year long presence in Europe, whereby references are made to the golden period of 1867-
1914, or to its position as buffer state against Turkish influence. The Hungarians, however, also 
harbour a feeling of having been on the losing side in European power conflicts, in relation to which, 
the experience after the First World War (the effects of the Trianon Treaty) has been the most 
disturbing. The Hungarians share the feeling of the Poles that joining the EU is synonymous with 
regaining the country's (historically) rightful position in Europe. Nevertheless, the drive of the first 
democratically elected government in the beginning of the 1990s to tackle the Trianon syndrome is 
today increasingly seen as outdated and misplaced in view of Hungary's contemporary national 
interests and identity. The public at large seems likely to take a pragmatic view on the question of 
ethnic Hungarians, since it attaches importance to practical measures such as being able to travel and 
visit freely relatives in neighbouring countries (hence, the importance of the future application of the 
provisions of the Schengen-regime). The general atmosphere in Hungary today does not indicate any 
deep-rooted opposition to European integration, nor does there seem to be any conflict between 
national identity and European unification. Nevertheless, fears are sometimes expressed about the 
survival of the Hungarian language and cultural specificity in view of the strong harmonising drive of 
a homogeneous European 'super-culture'. With time, however, the Hungarian elite has become 
increasingly confident about the country's progress in terms of economic and democratic transition, 
and now expects the EU to prepare itself in order to accommodate a number of new member states. 
The fear of not being able/ready to join has given way to a fear that EU membership will be delayed 
due to inadequate internal development within the EU. 
The Slovakian national identity is influenced by two fundamental elements: the limited experience of 
national independence and statehood which makes it more correct to refer to the historical importance 
of the Slovak people and the pride of belonging to the Slovak community; and the split of 
Czechoslovakia in 1993 followed by the establishment of the Slovak state, which was the starting 
point for the process of building a national identity. The fact that in history, the Slovak people were 
subject to the political domination of a number of neighbouring countries has led national identity to 
be defined mainly in terms of opposition to the outside world. In the contemporary context, it has also 
induced the population to consent to political action against perceived foreign interference and 
dominance. After the split in 1993, Slovak politicians and the current regime in particular have put 
much emphasis on the question of identity and independence, turning it into the overriding concern in 
the formulation of policies regarding economic modernisation and democratic and administrative 
reforms. The nation-building aspect has also been decisive in the current government's handling of the 
question of ethnic minorities, particularly the Hungarian minority. 
The delegation in Bratislava pointed out that due to the still limited experience of independent 
statehood and the on-going process of defining a Slovak national identity, the process of European 
integration could in some ways be premature for Slovakia. This interpretation explains Slovakia's 
difficulty to accept the monitoring and assessment of its fulfilment of the contractual obligations 
towards the Union. It also explains the Slovak regime's dismay with various decisions, 
recommendations and demarches of the EU which have been perceived as undue interference in 
Slovakia's domestic affairs. 
There is also an underlying fear that European integration will substantially erode the recently 
acquired national sovereignty and that the EU is dominated by the big member states to whose will 
small-and-medium sized countries like Slovakia have to bow ( often with reference to the Soviet 
Union). There is a certain inclination on the part of the current political regime to adopt a 'go-it-alone' 
policy. It resides in the old Czechoslovak 'bridge theory' according to which countries in the heart of 
Europe (central Europe) would form a link between east and west without being part of any side, 
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3. 2. 2 Slovenia and the Baltic States 
This heading regroups four small-sized countries, for whom belonging to Europe is an essential part of 
the formulation of their re-confirmed national identity/sovereignty as well as a way to escape imposed 
alien regimes or sets of values. Because of the size of the countries, their recent history and their wish 
to 'join' Europe as a means to flee the past, European integration is simultaneously seen as immensely 
desirable, but also linked with some dangers to national identity and sovereignty. Recent historical 
experiences have left these countries, at least in the case of the Baltic republics, with a very real 
concern for the survival of the independent state and a constant reminder of the past in the form of 
ethnic minorities. 
Although the Yugoslav regime was not oppressive to the same degree as the Soviet regime, there was 
a distinct feeling in Slovenia that escaping from Yugoslavia and Communism was synonymous with 
fleeing to the West. Since independence, as national identity came to the forefront, a much higher 
value was attached to close identification with Europe than identification with the Balkans. The latter 
was linked to everything bad, while the former was dressed only in positive attributes. However, as the 
links with the EU have intensified, some policy implications have come in conflict with Slovene 
sensitivities ( e.g. the right of EU citizens to purchase property). There are indications that the present 
positive public perception could change if the EU was perceived to be intruding in what is regarded as 
internal Slovenian affairs. There is also a fear that European integration could erode national 
sovereignty and dilute Slovene identity. 
In the Baltic States, the question of national identity is in many ways connected to the concept of the 
survival of the independent state (especially since the unpredictability of Russia is deeply felt). The 
Baltic peoples' belonging to Europe was given primary importance towards the end of the Soviet 
regime, and has played a significant role in defining national identity after independence. EU 
membership is seen as part of a series of linkages to the western world considered necessary to ensure 
the continuation of the national independence of the Baltic States. There is, however, a noticeable fear 
that European integration could lead to a loss of national identity and impinge upon sovereignty. Some 
(small) parts of the Baltic societies go as far as to draw parallels between the EU and the Soviet Union. 
Although such arguments belong to fringe groups, poor knowledge about the EU among the public 
could prove a fertile ground for emotionally argued opposition against EU integration. In this context, 
co-operation between the states around the Baltic Sea is seen with less apprehension and fulfils an 
important role in enhancing political and cultural affinities among the populations of these countries. 
In terms of national identity, this part of the CEE is increasingly influenced by the US, mainly through 
strong ties to Baltic emigrants (of whom quite a few have returned to their mother countries and enjoy 
a high degree of admiration from their compatriots). In general, the Baltic States view strong ties with 
the USA as being crucial for their national security. Since NATO membership is not on the immediate 
agenda, the Baltic States have chosen to concentrate on attracting strategic American FDI and to 
develop as a strong political partnership as possible with the USA. 
The legacy of the century-long Russian dominance, in particular in the guise of the Soviet Union and 
its policy of ethnic assimilation, has left Latvia and Estonia to tackle the question of large Russian 
minorities within their territories. During the early stages of the process of independence, national 
rhetoric, built as it was on national myths, traditions and historical symbols, often turned resentful 
towards the Baltic Russians. Lately, as national independence looks firmly established and the Baltic 
republics have set up close links with western neighbours and institutions, there is an increasingly 
strong realisation that the viability of sovereignty in the long run is based on the creation of a multi-
ethnic democracy. Likewise, the formulation of national identity and citizenship in Estonia and Latvia 
has to leave room for incorporating also the concept of Baltic Russian citizens. It is telling in this 
context, that Baltic Russians seem to attach their hopes to future EU membership in overcoming the 
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3.2.3 The South-Eastern European Countries 
In Bulgaria, there is a strong sense of belonging to the Bulgarian nation, whose importance is 
recognised both among the public as well as in elite circles. In fact, a strong popular sense of national 
identity and the importance of an independent foreign policy among the elite are two elements of 
particular salience in Bulgaria. The process of getting to grips with the membership requirements of 
the EU and their possible impact on the Bulgarian society is still in an early phase. In Bulgaria, as in 
some other CEECs, perhaps the greatest source of misunderstanding may form around the centrality of 
the concept of the rule of law within the EU legislative framework. A well-known concern of western 
policy-makers is the illegal CD production sites in Bulgaria. Up until now warnings of a breach of 
international economic agreements in this area have been met with resistance and incomprehension 
from parts of the economic elite and the wider public. In part, this lack of understanding may be 
attributed to Bulgaria's relatively late reform process and still weak institutions. The country has, 
however, made considerable progress since the presidential election at the end of 1996 and the 
formation of a new government. Despite the fact that some economic interests may brace themselves 
for further integration with the EU, the Bulgarian population as a whole understands that the EU 
provides a modernising perspective for the Bulgarian nation and society. 
The Bulgarian perception of Europe is not synonymous with the present membership of the EU, but 
goes naturally further. Without necessarily regarding Russia and Turkey as future EU members, 
Bulgaria has both material and emotional/cultural interests in developing closer ties with these 
countries. 
The Romanian national identity is closely associated with the feeling of the country being a 'great 
European' nation, not because Romanians see their country as a future big member state of the Union 
(there is as yet no indication to that effect), but rather because of the resolute identification of 
Romanian national identity with European culture. The concept of being an integral part of Europe is, 
in Romania, tied to its identification with ancient history (Greek, Latin and Byzantine), the Romanian 
language and the symbols of European culture and history. The Romanian elite extensively used the 
widespread attachment to European culture and civilisation as an argument in its efforts to bolster 
national identity, pride and cohesiveness of the Romanian society after the Ceaucescu regime. The 
definition of a modem Romanian identity has yet to take on the more concrete form needed to explain 
to the Romanian population the tangible obligations of EU membership. On the popular level, the 
strong emotional identification with Europe (and subsequently the EU) makes it difficult for ordinary 
Romanians to understand measures in place which seem to exclude them from being part of Europe, 
for instance visa restrictions. Another expression of the strong cultural and civilisational identification 
with Europe is the fact that Romania does not acknowledge Turkey's eligibility for EU membership, 





















4. Focus on the relationship to the EU 
4.1 Elite and Popular Attitudes towards the EU 
Despite the diversity of the ten applicant countries from CEE, the objectives for seeking accession to 
the EU are largely the same. Across all ten countries, three reasons for joining the EU stand out as 
being the most important. First, EU membership constitutes a means to become part of "Europe" once 
again. By joining the EU, the CEECs wish to become an integral part of Europe (the two are often 
used interchangeably), and want to play a political role in the shaping of the continent's future, thus 
putting an end to the artificial East-West separation of the Cold War era. 
Secondly, the CEECs wish to join the Union for the economic benefits that this could bring to them. 
The expectations that EU membership could be economically beneficial centre around the improved 
access to the internal market, eligibility for support from EU funds, and the anchor of modernisation 
for countries where the economic transformation process is far from complete. Economic 
modernisation is necessary both to become member of the EU and, more generally, to be able to 
compete in an increasingly internationalised economic environment. This dimension is fairly well 
understood in elite circles, but not always among the wider public. In this context, the role model for 
the CEECs is not only the EU, but also the USA. 
The third objective for joining the EU that is shared by all the CEECs, is the security and stability that 
EU membership would provide. Half a century of direct Soviet occupation or indirect Soviet control 
has left these countries sensitive to the possibility of future aggression on the part of Russia and 
desirous of the "security bonus" of EU membership. Beyond this, however, membership in the EU 
could also constitute an element of stability in regions characterised by border conflicts and minority 
problems. It is hardly surprising that the security and stability that would follow from EU membership 
is judged to be among the most important reasons for joining the EU in the three Baltic States, Poland, 
and Slovenia. Finally, it should be mentioned that the firmer establishment of democratic principles 
and the rule of law in, for example, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Estonia, are rated by the 
delegations as prominent objectives for seeking accession to the EU. 
Public opinion in the CEECs is generally positive towards the European Union and largely supports 
EU membership. The future development of public support for the EU is partly related to the level of 
knowledge about the EU in the applicant countries. The relatively high support for EU membership in 
the CEECs is generally matched by a poor, or even very poor, understanding of the policy-making 
process within the EU as well as the obligations that follow from membership. Often, the EU is 
associated with a carefree existence of economic well-being and consumerism, as evidenced by the 
fact that economic development and higher living standards is the prime reason why the citizens of the 
CEECs declare themselves to have a positive impression of the EU. As people in CEE become more 
aware of what EU membership really implies, the reality might fall short of meeting these high 
material expectations, with a resultant drop in public support. 
4.2 The Significance of the European Security Dimension 
Military security and stable, peaceful relations with European neighbours feature as one of the main 
reasons why the CEECs wish to become members of the EU. However, the implicit security 
guarantee, or "security bonus", that the EU can offer, is generally not considered sufficient. Rather, in 
terms of security and stability, EU membership is part of a broader quest where membership in NATO 
is the primary aim. All the applicant countries have also expressed an interest in NATO membership 
and in July 1997, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were formally invited, with membership 
awaiting ratification in NATO member states during 1998. 
Both the public and the elites in the applicant countries consider membership in NATO to be essential 
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put to the people in a national referendum in November 1997, over 85% of the population voted for 
accession, although the turnout was low (less than 50% of the eligible voters took part). The elites in 
the CEECs generally regard NATO as the primary arm of the European security structure and the only 
organisation capable of providing credible security guarantees. 
The attitudes towards and the quest for NATO membership are also conditioned by the specific 
geographical, historical, and political contexts of the applicant countries. In the Baltic States, the 
security vacuum is seen to be particularly acute and they, therefore, look to western security structures 
such as NATO and the WEU to fill this gap and to provide the security they consider essential to guard 
their recently restored independence. In Bulgaria, for instance, NATO is viewed more as a political 
step to anchor the country within the West, rather than as a pure security guarantee. Moreover, 
Bulgaria is anxious to strike a balance between establishing closer ties with NATO and maintaining 
good relations with Russia. In Slovenia, membership of NATO and the EU is considered essential in 
view of the instability of the Balkans. In Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, there is a general 
conviction that European security at large can only be guaranteed by NATO, and that membership of 
this organisation is thus imperative. 
The notion that NATO is the primary guarantor of security and stability is indicative of the strong 
emphasis within the CEECs on the transatlantic dimension of the European security structure. 
European security is viewed as intimately connected with the continued commitment and involvement 
of the US and the preservation of the transatlantic security community. Any weakening of this link, 
e.g. through the formulation of a more independent European military structure, would also entail a 
weakening of European security. In the Czech Republic, for example, it is posited that EU military 
structures can only be reinforced at the expense of NATO, and the Czech Republic consequently 
opposes such structures. Similarly, the Czechs are committed to the WEU, but would prefer that it 
remained outside the EU's institutional structure. 
While EU and NATO military structures are thus viewed in some quarters as competing, it should be 
emphasised that the processes leading to EU and NATO membership are primarily regarded as 
complementary in the CEECs. In terms of security, both EU and NATO membership serve to anchor 
these countries to the West and to provide explicit or implicit security guarantees. In the Hungarian 
campaign proceeding the referendum on NATO membership, this interconnection was made explicit 
in that the processes leading to EU and NATO membership were presented as inseparable and 
complementary. Nevertheless, to the extent that EU and NATO membership serve the same security 
purposes, membership of one of the organisations might reduce the enthusiasm of joining and signing 
up to the costs and obligations of the other. With NATO membership almost secured, Poles, Czechs, 
and Hungarians increasingly consider their countries' vital security interests to be protected, which 
might reduce the public's perception of the necessity of EU membership. 
4.3 Possible Attitudes and Positions of the CEECs as Members of the EU 
Future policy positions of the applicant countries will influence the formulation of European policies, 
the development of the EU's institutional structure, future enlargements, and relations with non-
European countries. These questions are obviously subject to a high level of uncertainty, since clear 
government positions do not yet exist in the CEECs, nor is it possible to judge the future influence of 
these countries on the development of the Union. Based on public sentiments and indications of 






















Survey of National Identity 
4.3.1 Priorities for EU Policies Based on Hopes of Economic and Security Gains 
In terms of likely future positions on EU policies, the CEECs support continued Community 
involvement in certain areas, diverge on the desirability and importance of other European policy 
domains, and care little for a third group of policies. Policy domains where continued Community 
involvement is considered imperative are the completion of the single market, monetary union, 
cohesion policy and structural funds, military security, the CFSP, free movement of people, police co-
operation and immigration management within the domain of justice and home affairs. Typically, 
these are areas that are expected to provide further economic modernisation or even economic gains 
(single market, Euro, EU funds), "hard" security (military co-operation and the CFSP) and "soft" 
security (justice and home affairs) gains, and which respond to the immediate needs of the CEECs. 
Concerning other policies, the positions of the CEECs are still subject to a fair amount of uncertainty. 
In general, however, the further a CEEC is from fulfilling the requirements of the Community acquis, 
the less clear are the country's specific positions regarding Community policies and scope of common 
action (see appendix 1). 
Little interest and/or low support for common EU policies is most noticeable within the domains of 
fisheries and aid to developing countries. Given that fishery is a fairly irrelevant sector to most of 
these countries (apart from Estonia), the limited interest in this area is understandable. It is more 
noteworthy that none of the applicant countries attaches any importance to aid to developing countries. 
This stance is indicative of a broader trend of a search for economic gains in the CEECs, and differs 
substantially from the solidarity in the field of foreign aid on which the Union puts great emphasis and 
commits considerable resources to. It is also indicative of a lack of traditional affinity with the 
countries in the developing world that can in part be attributed to the absence of historical colonial 
links. In some cases, an alternative explanation may be found in the experience of forced exchanges of 
experts and workers with Communist countries in other parts of the world, imposed by the leadership 
in Moscow during the Cold War. 
4.3.2 The Future Shape of the Union's Institutional Set-up 
The likely positions of the CEECs differ on the question of the institutional development of the EU as 
well as on the desirability of certain essential institutional aspects. Their positions on these issues are 
surrounded by an even higher degree of uncertainty than those concerning EU policies. There is no 
single model of co-operation that constitutes the dominant preference of the different applicant 
countries (see appendix 2). It should be noted that, in general, the CEECs share the concern not to 
become second class members of the EU confined to participation in peripheral areas and with limited 
access to hard core decision-making. 
With respect to an essential institutional issue such as the supremacy of EC law over national law, this 
is an aspect of supranationalism that the CEECs generally consider positive rather than negative. Part 
of the explanation for this relative approval might lie in the desire of the applicant countries to firmly 
establish the rule of law, as their national judicial systems currently suffer from certain weaknesses. A 
general note of caution regarding this indicator is in place, since it is questionable whether many of the 
CEECs have fully understood the implications of the supremacy of EC law. This interpretation is 
supported by the fact that all applicant countries do not prefer supranational solutions across the board, 
but are very protective of maintaining of national vetoes in the decision-making process. As to the 
suggestion of weighting the Community institutions in favour of the large member states, the countries 
split along predictable lines of division. Poland, and to a lesser extent Romania and Bulgaria, would 
welcome such a development, while Estonia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia are 
opposed to a weighting in favour of the large member states. The positions of the CEECs on the issue 
of intergovemmentalism versus federalism do not point in the direction of the one or the other. Certain 
countries, such as Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, express a preference for 
intergovemmentalism, while Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Estonia and Romania do not have a clear 
position. In general, the question may be raised whether these national preferences are stronger than 





















Survey of National Identity 
4.3.3 Relations with the European Neighbourhood 
With the accession of the applicant countries, their borders, conflicts, and relationships to other 
countries will be those of the EU. While on the whole good, the relations between the applicant 
countries and their neighbours contain some potential conflicts. In some cases, occasional tensions 
between an EU member state and a CEEC arises due to a historical event. For instance, the Czech -
German relations have been overshadowed by the Sudeten question, which keeps coming back in the 
domestic debate within the two countries. Slovenian and Italian relations are still strained by the 
question ofrestitution of property possessed by Italians before the end of the Second World War. 
The relations between the CEECs have at times been cool mainly due to ethnic minorities or due to 
specific events, like the partition of Czechoslovakia. In this context, both Hungary and the Czech 
Republic have a rather cold relationship with Slovakia. On the other hand, the conclusion of a number 
of bilateral friendship and co-operation agreements has improved relations between many CEECs. The 
relation between Estonia and Latvia, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, is clouded by the 
question of the status of the Russian minorities in these countries, while the relations between 
Lithuania and Russia is generally satisfactory (Lithuania concluded an early border agreement with 
Russia in connection with Kaliningrad). The current Polish government is pursuing an active policy 
towards its eastern neighbours aimed at building a large area of stability in CEE and re-establishing 
links with regions under direct Polish influence in former times. Although relations with some of these 
countries, for instance with Belarus, are far from unproblematic, Poland is establishing increasingly 
close links with a range of neighbouring countries, including Lithuania, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova 
and Romania. A number of applicant countries has expressed sympathy with Croatia and FYROM, 
while many of them have cool relations with Serbia (for instance, Hungary and Slovenia), but this 
would change if the situation improves in the country. 
Despite the clouded relations between some of the applicant countries, they are in general positive 
towards the accession of each other to the European Union. The political and historical contexts of the 
countries determine the intensity with which the CEECs desire other applicant countries to become 
members. Estonia, for example, is generally positive towards the accession of the other Baltic States as 
well as the other "front runners" Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia, while it seems 
quite indifferent to the accession of the remaining applicant countries. Likewise, Hungary is firmly 
supportive of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia, positive towards Slovakia, Estonia, and 
Romania, but rather uninterested in the accession of Latvia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria. Poland, typically, 
strongly favours the accession of Lithuania next to that of Hungary and the Czech Republic. The 
Slovak government still raises the question whether Estonia or Cyprus were judged by the same 
criteria as Slovakia with respect to minority rights in the Commission's Opinions of 1997. 
The CEECs' positions on further enlargement beyond the current eleven applicant countries are also 
conditioned by historical, geographical and political considerations. Estonia, for example, is 
supportive of the future accession of the Ukraine when sufficiently developed, possibly also of 
Croatia, but not of Russia and Belarus. Romania favours further enlargement to Moldova and the 
Ukraine, but does not consider that Turkey has any claim to be a serious candidate. Slovenia would be 
ready to support Croatia's and FYROM's attempts to join the European integration process, but is 
likely to be opposed to the accession of Serbia (until the internal situation changes drastically towards 
a democratic means of government). Poland is more restrictive and does not desire any additional 
members beyond the current applicant countries, with the exception of the Ukraine. Hungary puts 
great emphasis on the accession criteria and would argue against enlargement to any country that does 
not fulfil them. No applicant country is against enlargement to the remaining West European non-EU 
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4.3.4 The CEECs and the World: Foreign Policy Orientations 
Once members, the applicant countries will contribute to the foreign policy orientation of the 
European Union. The foreign policy priorities of the applicant countries may thus give an indication of 
the direction in which the EU foreign policy attention might develop. With respect to the enlarged 
Union's immediate neighbours, it is clear that the accession of the ten CEEC reinforces the attention 
eastwards and south-eastwards, reflecting geopolitical and economic concerns in these countries. All 
the applicant countries attach great importance to the relations with Russia and the Ukraine. Other CIS 
republics are also considered a foreign policy priority in Poland, the Baltic States, Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic and Bulgaria. Turkey constitutes a high priority for Slovakia and Bulgaria, and is considered 
important in the Czech Republic, Romania, Hungary and Poland. The applicant countries generally 
give the Black Sea/Caucasus, the Near East, and the Maghreb little importance. Only Bulgaria and 
Romania consider the Black Sea region and the Caucasus to be very important. Similarly, the Near 
East including Israel is only viewed to be of some importance in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic. No applicant country attaches any priority to the Maghreb. 
The global priorities of the CEECs give reason to think that the accession of these ten countries is 
more likely to reinforce the EU's attention both eastwards and westwards, rather than solely 
eastwards. On the world level, the applicant countries are extremely focused in their attention on the 
US, which can provide both security and economic gains as well as political global leadership, and 
other important economic actors such as Japan, South East Asia, China and to a certain extent, India. 
Among all regions, North America is the one to which the CEECs attach the most importance par 
excellence. Japan, China, and South East Asia are also considered important, while South America is 
less so. Poor regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the Pacific, the Caribbean and Central America, are 
not considered to be of any importance whatsoever. This firm emphasis on rich and politically 
powerful regions and potential trade partners mirrors the emphasis which the CEECs place on 
economic progress and potential gains. In the case of the US, there are also strong links of affinity 








































5. Conclusion: Towards an Enlarged European Union 
The process of integrating the candidate countries in CEE into the EU has started and is being 
intensified with the opening of the accession negotiations and the conclusion of the Accession 
Partnerships. The process is set to have a significant influence on the future shape of the EU, while the 
obligations of accession will have a deep impact on the CEECs' economic, social and democratic 
modernisation. Since we are in the midst of a long process, it is impossible to say what will be the 
precise outcome of eastern enlargement on the future shape of the Union, in terms of policies, 
institutional set-up, orientation towards the wider world and relationship to the European public. 
Moreover, enlargement of the EU is taking place against a background of deep structural change 
affecting our societies, such as technological and scientific advancement, change in values, or the 
wider phenomenon of globalisation. This report highlights some characteristics of the national 
identities of the CEECs which could have a bearing on the integration process, and gives some 
indications as to their possible influence on the future direction of EU policies, priorities regarding 
internal and external orientations or preferences for the institutional evolution of the Union. 
5.1 National Identity of the CEECs in the Context of European Integration 
Fears of not being able to preserve national identity in the context of integration have been present in 
public debates on EU accession in all previous rounds of enlargement. Considerations of this sort are 
linked to the question of national sovereignty and the possibility for individual member states to retain 
their room for manoeuvre. As a general rule, the more a country's stated set of policies, political 
priorities and agreed values are seen as compatible with the perceived social, economic and the 
political regime of the EU, the easier it has been for that country to find harmony between its national 
identity and the EU integration process. 
For a number of reasons, the question of national identity can be expected to play a crucial role in the 
eastward enlargement of the EU: 
• Given past and recent historical experiences, the national identity of the CEECs either developed 
late compared to western Europe and/or had to endure foreign dominance which, particularly in 
the case of Communism, had a detrimental effect on the fabric of their societies. At the beginning 
of the 1990s, national identity was used as a means to justify the right to independent statehood 
and sovereignty. Due to the close links between national identity and national independence, 
several delegations have warned against the serious consequences which could result from 
misunderstandings concerning the nature of the European integration process, especially if it came 
to be seen as a threat to national identity. 
• National identity as formulated in the early 1990s was composed of a strong degree of 
identification with 'Europe'. Belonging to 'Europe' meant breaking with the previous Communist 
past. In many cases, however, this initial identification with 'Europe' was rather shallow. Little 
thought was devoted to the concrete dimensions of EU membership and how they might affect 
traditional 'ways of living'. On the other hand, western political leaders and administrative elite 
had little idea about the real or spiritual needs of the countries in transition, let alone how these 
countries' accession to the EU could influence its future shape. The learning process of pan-
European integration is still only its initial phase. Several delegations pointed out that because 
many concepts central to the idea of European integration are poorly understood in the CEECs, the 
EU could become the subject of misconceptions of varying degrees of which the most extreme is 
the equation between the EU and the Soviet Union. 
• In the case of the CEECs, the social, economic and institutional reforms necessary for a correct 
adoption of the EU acquis constitute more than just streamlining national legislation: they involve 
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societies. The positive interpretation of this process is to describe EU membership as the CEECs' 
anchor of modernisation, while a more sinister one is to see it as imposing on these countries an 
alien social, economic and institutional framework. In either case, the question of national identity 
is crucial: unless the CEECs, also at the popular level, feel that the integration process will benefit 
their societies at least in the long run, the support for European integration will be half-hearted at 
best. In a worse case, it could even disrupt its future development. 
• Many of the CEECs see themselves as small countries, vulnerable to external dominance. They 
are, therefore, more likely to fear a dilution of their national identity/independence than previous, 
bigger or more self-confident, candidate countries. On the other hand, the gains in economic or 
security terms of belonging to the EU are strong arguments in favour of the EU, particularly since 
few CEECs see any alternatives to membership. Moreover, European integration could help to 
overcome some problems related to national identity, neighbourly relations and ethnic minorities. 
On the basis of these considerations, there seems to be a real need to establish a process, parallel to 
the technical and diplomatic relations between the EU and the CEECs, aimed at creating a wider 
understanding for the principles of European integration. At the same time, the concept of 
European identity should be demystified - it is not equal to the imposition of a harmonised western 
European identity-mould, but meant to reinforce existing national and regional identities. It should 
also be widened to embrace the cultural, historical and social specificity of eastern Europe. Almost 
all delegations pointed to the need to explain the principles of European integration and the 
concept of European identity on the elite and popular levels either through information campaigns 
or concrete examples of common projects, participation in EU programmes or other types of 
exchanges with the EU and its member states. Many also pointed out their limited resources to 
engage in a wide public exercise, and that the delegations' staff should be properly trained for 
such activities or assisted by the Commission in Brussels by, for example, a question and answer 
helpdesk. 
The identity dimension should also be taken seriously in the way in which the progressive 
integration of individual CEECs is handled. The delegations in Romania and Bulgaria underlined 
the already negative impact of the Visa restrictions on travel to EU member states on the publics' 
perception of the EU. Many delegations also highlighted the potential danger of erecting new 
physical barriers between the CEECs and beyond as some are gradually included in the Schengen 
area, and the potential danger of separating ethnic groups. 
5.2 Some Possible Implications of the Accession of the CEECs to the EU 
The replies from the delegations clearly show the different states of preparedness for EU membership 
in the CEECs that largely coincide with the Commission's recommendations for accession 
negotiations. The candidates that are entering substantial negotiations with the EU seem to have a 
better understanding of the EU's policies and mechanisms, and have formulated clearer positions 
regarding their policy objectives. In the case of Bulgaria and Slovakia, the delegations pointed out that 
some implications of EU membership ( e.g. importance of the rule of law as a fundamental principle of 
integration) could be premature for these two countries, and are, at any rate, not fully understood. 
Common to all countries, however, is the little thought that seems to have been given to questions 
related to the institutional structure of the EU and their particular future place within it. Moreover, in 
some cases (e.g. the Czech Republic or Slovakia), it is difficult to know today if the positions 
indicated by current governments and elites are likely to prevail in the medium-to-long-term. 
• In terms of EU policies, the analysis points at a general orientation with few surprises with 
emphasis on economic gains (above all, the structural funds), or hard or soft security gains. The 
most striking element concerns the developing world as the CEECs seem to attach little 
importance to the wider concept of solidarity: across the board, aid to developing countries attracts 
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once inside the Union new CEE member states could come to take positions pointing in a different 
direction than that of the current Community development policy. In the allocation of financial 
resources, the CEECs can be expected to favour the Union's eastern rather than its southern 
neighbourhood or more distant geographical areas. The enhanced JHA is likely to give rise to some 
apprehension both in terms of erecting barriers between existing candidate countries as well as 
upsetting existing and potential cross-border initiatives and various spontaneous activities. In this 
connection, commercial, cultural and political activities set up in order to enhance stability in the area 
of the enlarged Union's neighbourhood could suffer from reduced possibilities for people to travel. 
• The CEECs' international outlook is coloured by concerns similar to those regarding their policy 
objectives: expectations for economic and security gains are the overriding preoccupation. As the 
foremost foreign policy priority is attached to the USA both in terms of security (NATO) and in 
terms of political leadership and economic potential, most CEECs may be expected to favour 
continued close links between the Union and the USA, and would probably welcome stronger 
commercial transatlatic relations. In the security field, to the extent that deeper European 
integration could be seen as incompatible with strong US involvement in Europe, some CEECs 
(e.g. the Czech Republic) would not hesitate to give priority to continued good relations with the 
US. An independent European defence identity (if it were seen as contrary to close US 
involvement in Europe) could not be expected to be greeted with enthusiasm by most CEECs, 
unless the current transatlantic security structure had already changed radically. 
• Concerning the countries in the neighbourhood, the CEECs supports a closer relationship with the 
Ukraine, including a future EU membership, and some of them ( e.g. Poland) can be expected to 
prioritise strongly closer EU-Ukraine relations. Many CEECs take a reluctant position towards a 
potential future Turkish membership of the EU, with the exception of Bulgaria which supports it 
strongly. This reticence is probably due to historical experiences, lack of cultural affinity, and 
possibly also to the prospect of the inclusion of a big country with a numerous and poor population 
(in relative terms) with the potential of becoming a strong competitor for EU funds. Most CEECs, 
however, attach importance to Turkey as a priority area for the Union's foreign policy. Historical 
ties also shine through in Romania's strong support of a membership bid from Moldova. The CEECs 
are unanimous in indicating Russia as a foremost foreign policy priority of the Union, but the 
possibility of a future Russian EU membership is not suggested by any of the candidate countries, 
and Estonia and Latvia, for instance, would most probably oppose such a development. Poland can 
be expected to want to act as a regional leader in relation to countries in its neighbourhood 
(Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Romania). Once a member of the EU, it can be expected 
that Poland would like to reinforce stability in the Union's eastern neighbourhood by putting 
emphasis on its strategic importance. In this context, the concerns regarding the implications of the 
JHA (see above) are relevant for the stability in the Union's neighbourhood. 
• Very little can be said with any certainty concerning the CEECs' positions on the future 
institutional dimension of the Union. The entry of new CEE member states will tip the balance 
towards small member states and they will probably favour the possibility to retain the veto on 
questions of vital national interest - a position in line with their quite vocal fear of the erosion of 
national sovereignty inside the EU. It can therefore be expected that an institutional reform along 
the lines that were proposed during the IGC of 96-97 would be more difficult to realise after the 
entry of new CEE member states. Of course, the CEECs would like to show that there are 'good' 
Europeans and behave accordingly, but most of them are neither fervent federalists, nor persistent 
intergovemmentalists. Moreover, the process of learning, necessary for understanding fully the 
special relations and way of working between EU member states should not be underestimated. 
The CEECs will need some time to get accustomed to institutional dynamics and coalition-
building before the institutional machinery of the enlarged Union could be made to function 
smoothly. Their basic instincts today are of an intergovernmental character, not because they do 
not support integration, but simply because this is the form of co-operation they know best. 
Previous experiences of inter-state relations have often been based on coercion and forced 
assimilation. 
31 
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2.2. Positions on the principal Community policies 
<;::i What are the applicant country's positions on the following Community policies?* 
Poland Hungary Czech Slovakia Slovenia Estonia Latvia 
Republic 
Completion of the single market ++ ++ ++ + 0 ++ 
Monetary union ++ ++ 0 ++ + ++ 
Social Europe: employment policy + + - ++ + 0 
Social Europe: fundamental rights + + + 0 + 0 
Military security +/0 + ++ + + ++ 
Arms 0 + 0 0 ++ 
Other aspects of the CFSP (non military) + ++ 0 + + ++ 
Justice and home affairs (free movement) ++ ++ 0 + 0 ++ 
Justice and home affairs (police cooperation, Europol) ++ ++ + + + ++ 
Justice and home affairs (immigration management) + ++ + + + ++ 
Cohesion policy - Structural Funds ++ ++ 0 ++ ++ ++ 
Common commercial policy + + + 0 + ++ 
Industrial and research policy ++ ++ 0 + ++ 0 
Environment ++ + 0 ++ 0 ++ 
Common agricultural policy 0 ++ - + + ++ 
Fisheries 0 0 0 0 
Tax harmonisation + + ++ 0 
Aid to developing countries + 0 0 0 0 0 
* (++ the country strongly supports Community action in the given area; - - it strongly opposes Community action in the given area.) 
** all depends on EU policy or visas for Romania 
- - - - -
Annex 1 
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Annex 2 
3.1 Nature of the integration process 
~ What are the national preferences regarding the various possible forms of institutional architecture indicated below?* 
Poland Hungary Czech Slovakia Slovenia Estonia Latvia Lithuania Bulgaria Romania 
Republic 
Multi-speed EU (with a hard core/concentric circles) + + -- 0 0 ++ + 
Variable-geometry Europe (by subject) + ++ ++ 0 + + 
Single Market and cooperation a la carte - + - 0 0 
*(++ strongly in favour; -- strongly opposed) 
I 
I PCL XL error 
Subsystem: KERNEL 
I Error: Illegal Tag 
Operator: Ox82 



































Le 8 mai 1990, les Institutions communautaires celebrent le 40e anniversaire de la 
Declaration de Robert Schuman. Ole Due, president de la Gour de justice, rappelle a cette 
occasion que c'est un droit nouveau qui a vu le jour a cette occasion. 
• • • 
Action et vision politiques, tels sont les elements qui caracterisent la Declaration Schuman. Elle ne constitue 
pas en soi ce que les juristes appellent une source de droit, mais elle reste, avec les idees qui en forment la 
base, une source d'inspiration pour la Cour de justice comme pour toutes les autres Institutions des 
Communautes. 
( ... ) 
La Declaration proposait de creer un regime base sur le droit. Non pas le droit international classique, mais 
un droit de caractere nouveau qui s'imposait aussi bien aux entreprises qu'aux Etats. 
La Cour, qui fut ensuite creee par le traite CECA, avec pour tache generale, confirmee plus tard par les deux 
autres traites, "d'assurer le respect du droit dans !'interpretation et !'application du traite", a suivi ces idees 
innovatrices dans sa jurisprudence. 
Elle s'est bien gardee d'interpreter les traites communautaires comme s'ils etaient des traites de droit 
international classique. Elle a developpe des principes d'interpretation aptes a sauvegarder le plein exercice, 
par Jes Institutions, de leurs competences, et a assurer l'effet utile des regles communautaires. Elle a reconnu 
a toute regle imposant aux Etats membres des obligations claires, precises et inconditionnelles, un effet direct 
dans Jes systemes juridiques internes de ces Etats. Et pour Jes regles n'ayant pas un tel caractere, elle a 
souligne !'obligation de toute autorite nationale, judiciaire ou administrative, d'y donner effet dans le cadre de 
leurs competences et dans toute la mesure compatible avec le droit national. 
Dans l'exercice des competences que Jes traites lui ont conferees, et notamment dans le cadre de sa 
cooperation etroite avec les juridictions nationales sous forme de renvois prejudiciels, la Cour s'est ainsi 
efforcee de realiser pleinement Jes idees qui etaient a la base de la Declaration Schuman. Elle a pu le faire 
grace a son independance complete garantie par le traite et toujours pleinement respectee par les Etats 
membres comme par Jes autres Institutions. 




















Le 29 mars 1982, a !'occasion du 25e anniversaire de la signature des Traites de Rome, 
Josse Mertens de Wilmar, president de la Cour de justice, decrit l'apport du droit dans le 
processus d'integration europeenne. 
• • • 
Le droit communautaire, qu'on me permette de le souligner, est un des instruments privilegies de l'oeuvre a 
accomplir, car le droit est, par essence, "peaceful change" et !'integration europeenne n'est pas autre chose. Le 
respect du droit, tant sur le plan institutionnel que sur celui de la solidarite dans l'ordre economique et 
social, est un devoir qui incombe aux Institutions, aux Etats membres et aux citoyens communautaires. Les 
traites ont toutefois etabli, grace a un amenagement de competences particulierement judicieux, un ordre de 
juridictions charge de veiller a !'execution, par tous, de ce devoir. Ce pouvoir judiciaire communautaire ne 
comprend pas seulement la Cour de justice, mais reunit dans une cooperation organisee et permanente 
!'ensemble des juridictions des dix Etats membres et cette Cour. On ne saurait laisser passer un moment 
comme celui-ci, sans souligner combien cette cooperation a ete exemplaire, confiante, fructueuse -malgre 
certaines difficultes inevitables- et que c'est grace a elle qu'a pu etre realisee la volonte des fondateurs de la 
Communaute d'asseoir la construction europeenne sur des bases juridiques intangibles et admises par tous, et 
d'assurer au sein de cette Communaute une protectionjuridique digne d'un Etat de droit. 
La Cour de justice s'efforce d'apporter au mieux sa contribution a cette oeuvre commune. Elle a des devoirs 
particulierement imperieux d'objectivite et de reserve, mais elle n'entend pas, pour autant, n'etre qu'un 
observateur indifferent et glacial des drames de ce temps, des victoires ou defaites de notre liberte, des 
progres ou des echecs du "peaceful change". Dans le cadre de sa mission et dans !'observation des limites de 
cette mission, elle s'efforce de faire voir et de faire en sorte que les violations du droit communautaire ne 
profitent a personne. 
Elle pense avoir, ainsi, favorise la naissance d'un esprit juridique europeen, c'est-a-dire la conscience, non 
seulement chez les juristes mais egalement chez Jes justiciables, de !'existence et des bienfaits d'un ordre 
juridique communautaire. Au sein de cet ordre, elle a assigne une place eminente au respect des libertes et 
droits fondamentaux et elle se montre rigoureuse en ce qui conceme la conformite aux traites de !'action des 
Institutions et des Etats membres. 




















Le 10 mai 1995, la Commission europeenne adopte son rapport sur le fonctionnement du 
Traite sur l'Union europeenne qui lui avait ete commande par le Conseil europeen de 
Corfou. Elle y rappelle notamment les "acquis de quatre decennies d'integration 
europeenne". 
• • • 
En instituant une Communaute de duree illimitee, dotee d'institutions propres, de la personnalite juridique et 
de la capacite de representation internationale, les Etats membres ont adhere a une "organisation d'Etats" regie 
par des dispositions juridiques specifiques aux traites qui l'instaurent, ce qui la differencie fondamentalement 
des organisations etablies par Jes traites internationaux classiques. Ils ont mis en commun, dans des domaines 
determines, leurs droits souverains, creant un nouvel ordre juridique dont Jes sujets sont non seulement les 
Etats mais egalement leurs ressortissants. 
Ainsi est nee une Communaute fondee sur le droit. Les Etats qui la composent, petits ou grands, sont egaux 
en droit et en <lignite. L'Union qui Jes rassemble respecte la diversite de leurs identites et de leurs cultures. 
Mais cette diversite ne fait pas obstacle a la capacite de decider et d'agir. C'est le fruit d'un systeme 
institutionnel aux multiples vertus : ii assure, grace a la subsidiarite, un equilibre entre l'Union, les Etats 
membres et les regions ; il ajoute une nouvelle source de legitimite commune aux peuples europeens ; il 
assure enfin l'application efficace du droit communautaire sous le controle de la Cour de justice. 




















5 - Citoyennete 
Le 4 decembre 1991, quelques jours avant le Conseil europeen de Maastricht, !'Espagnol 
Enrique Baron Crespo, a l'epoque president du Parlement europeen, prononce un 
discours devant le College d'Europe a Bruges. II y souligne, entre autres, que les citoyens 
sent a la source de !'integration europeenne et que la citoyennete europeenne doit 
constituer son couronnement. 
• • • 
L'Union ( ... ) ne cree pas uniquement un lien entre des Etats. Elle unit egalement les citoyennes et les 
citoyens. C'est de ceux-ci qu'emane, par l'intermediaire du suffrage universe! direct, notre pouvoir. Ce sont 
eux qui deleguent la parcelle de souverainete qu'ils detiennent pour que nous en fassions le meilleur usage, 
c'est-a-dire pour que nous facilitions la vie quotidienne de 340 millions d'Europeens. 
Pour sceller ce lien, il importe de donner un statut propre au citoyen de !'Union. Ce statut, fonde sur le respect 
des droits fondamentaux de la personne, ce qui inclut egalement les droits_sociaux, devra leur garantir des 
droits en meme temps qu'il leur conferera des obligations. Nous ne devons pas oublier les ressortissants des 
Etats tiers qui resident legalement sur le territoire communautaire. 11 faudra leur conferer un statut commun 
dans tous nos Etats membres. 
En outre, au moment ou resurgit !'intolerance et renaissent les demons du passe, ii est indispensable que la 
Communaute s'engage resolument dans la Jutte contre le racisme et la xenophobie. Nous avons signe en 1986 
une declaration interinstitutionnelle sur ce sujet. II est plus que temps de la traduire en mesures 
communautaires. 
11 s'agit ainsi de concretiser le contenu de !'Union europeenne, et de montrer que les grands discours 
theoriques que nous developpons parfois ne perdent pas pied avec la realite. L'Union, c'est avant tout la 
liberte de circulation, de sejour, l'exercice libre d'activites professionnelles et economiques. 
C'est aussi donner a chacun le droit de vote et d'eligibilite aux elections locales et aux elections europeennes, 
dans l'Etat membre de residence. C'est encore developper le droit de petition dont dispose tout citoyen 
europeen devant le Parlement europeen. 
C'est enfin respecter un patrimoine culture! multiforme et mettre en valeur les diversites nationales et 
regionales qui font notre richesse. 




















Depuis la Declaration universelle des Droits de l'Homme des Nations Unis, 
en decembre 1948 jusqu'a !'elaboration progressive d'une jurisprudence europeenne en 
matiere de Droits de l'Homme appliquee dans les politiques internes de l'Union europeenne 
et !'exigence du respect de ces memes droits dans les accords internationaux... Une 
evolution d'un demi-siecle retracee dans un document de la Commission europeenne 
date d'octobre 1992. 
• • • 
This cursory account of the European Community's historical development bears witness to the increasing 
importance which human rights and democratic values have come to acquire in all areas of Community 
activity. Although ignored in the earlier acts of the Community, the principles of representative democracy 
and respect for human rights have rapidly become one of the central strands of both European integration and 
the affirmation of Europe's identity throughout the world. 
The Treaty on European Union signed on 7 February 1992 signifies a new chapter for the Community's 345 
million people. All the nationals of the Member States are called on to share in this multicultural and 
multilingual civilisation united by the same philosophy of the human condition and individual freedom, 
by the same understanding of the social contract and by the same ethical values. Every national of a Member 
State is a citizen of a Union which undertakes to uphold fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European 
Convention on Human Rights and as general principles of Community laws. Every citizen will be able to 
express his or her wishes through the political parties which, at European level, will be an important factor 
for integration within the Union. 
A Union which is closer to the citizens and which reaffirms the importance of the identities of the nations 
which make it up: the strict application of the subsidiarity principle to existing and future legislation by all the 
Member States and their citizens. The European Union will make it possible for European integration to 
progress in a manner consonant with the aspirations of the Member States and their citizens. The European 
Union will belong to its citizens. They are already free to live anywhere on its territory, where they enjoy 
a range of protection. They may vote and stand as candidates in municipal and European elections in their 
place of residence. Outside the Community, in a country where their own country is not represented, they will 
be entitled to the diplomatic and consular protection of any Member State on the same terms as nationals of 
that State. 
The European Union also has a role to play in keeping the peace and consolidating international security and 
in promoting the development and further strengthening of democracy and the rule of law and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. In striving to safeguard its shared values, fundamental interests 
and independence, the Union is rooted in the moral, humanitarian and universal values to which Europe 
has contributed so much throughout its history. 




















Dans la perspective de la Conference intergouvernementale qui doit reviser le 
fonctionnement du Traite de Maastricht, la Commission a redige un rapport d'evaluation 
qui, dans son avant-propos, s'interroge sur les enjeux majeurs pour l'Europe et ouvre des 
pistes pour "Preparer l'Europe du XXleme". 
• • • 
"( ... ) le contexte inteme de l'Union a change. Le debat autour de la ratification du traite sur l'Union 
europeenne a revele !'existence d'un courant de scepticisme a l'egard de !'oeuvre europeenne. Notre Europe 
souffre d'un deficit de comprehension et de lisibilite. Ce phenomene existe aussi au niveau national; les 
citoyens ne peryoivent plus tres bien !'impact des politiques qui se font en leur nom. 11 est amplifie au niveau 
europeen par la plus grande distance entre le citoyen et le centre de decision. 
Le premier enjeu de la future conference intergouvemementale est des lors tout trace: faire de l'Europe 
l'affaire des citoyens. La naissance d'un debat ouvert et contradictoire sur !'Europe est en realite une chance: 
l'Europe se construit desormais a visage decouvert. 
Des lors, !'ambition du traite, "une Europe plus proche des peoples", n'est pas pour la Commission une 
formule creuse, mais un imperatif absolu, un critere constant de ses initiatives. La Commission sera a 
l'ecoute des hommes et des femmes; elle se concentrera sur des voies europeennes pour combattre le 
chomage, preserver l'environnement, developper la solidarite. lei comme ailleurs, la Commission se fera 
l'interprete de l'interet general. 
( ... ) La democratie tient a la nature de l'Union, l'efficacite conditionne son avenir. C'est pourquoi ces deux 
criteres ont ete choisis pour guider !'evaluation du fonctionnement actuel du traite. Cette evaluation a son tour 
permet de degager les grandes orientations que la Commission suivra !ors de la prochaine conference 
intergouvemementale. 
L'une des innovations fondamentales qu'a apportees le traite en matiere de democratie a ete la notion de 
citoyennete europeenne. Son objet n'est pas de se substituer aux citoyennetes nationales, mais d'apporter 
une valeur ajoutee aux citoyens et de renforcer leur sentiment d'appartenance a l'Union. Les dispositions 
du traite font de la citoyennete un concept evolutif. La Commission recommande qu'on en tire toute le 
substance. De plus, alors que la construction europeenne est centree sur la democratie et les droits de 
l'Homme, le citoyen de l'Union ne peut, a ce stade, se prevaloir d'aucun texte fondamental faisant la synthese 
des droits et devoirs qui s'attachent a son statut. La Commission pense que cette lacune doit etre comblee, et 
cela d'autant plus qu'il doit s'agir la d'un instrument privilegie de promotion de l'egalite des chances et de lutte 
contre le racisme et la xenophobie." 




















Dans une note d'evaluation datant du 19 juillet 1995, la cellule de prospective de la 
Commission europeenne montre que pour etre adapte a une democratie multinationale le 
concept de "citoyennete europeenne" doit evoluer d'une definition purement juridique - la 
citoyennete se resume a une liste de devoirs et droits - vers une definition plus "active" qui 
favorise la participation des citoyens au processus democratique. 
• • • 
"L'un des axes importants du debat qui sera ouvert par la CIG de 1996 porte sur le renforcement de la 
<citoyennete europeenne>: quel contenu concret lui donner, pourquoi attribuer de !'importance a son 
affermissement, comment la promouvoir aujourd'hui? L'objectif de cette note est done d'elucider les 
conceptions qui inspirent les textes officiels europeens portant sur la citoyennete europeenne, afin de verifier 
leur adequation aux evolutions des societes europeennes et au projet d'une Union politique. 
Cette tentative d'eclaircissement est necessaire. Car, d'une part, la realisation du projet politique europeen est 
assez tirnide et la reflexion menee sur la question de la citoyennete europeenne encore embryonnaire; d'autre 
part, on a commence a transposer a l'echelle communautaire un modele de citoyennete propre a l'Etat-
nation sans prendre la juste mesure de l'originalite de l'entreprise europeenne: cette demiere vise a 
mettre en place une democratie multinationale qui applique le principe d'egalite a des individus mais aussi a 
des groupes culturels profondement differents, les nations europeennes. 
( ... ) Dans tout cet espace politique multiculturel, !'organisation institutionnelle de la multi-appartenance est 
problematique. Mais cette question devient profondement originale lorsqu'elle est appliquee au contexte 
europeen. Des leur fondation, les Etats-Unis et le Canada ont du tenir compte d'une population pluri-ethnique, 
composee des groupes culturels geographiquement disperses; tandis que l'Union europeenne se construit a 
partir d'entites politiques particulierement achevees et homogenes, qui ont une conscience identitaire tres 
forte: les liens entre citoyennete et nationalite y demeurant tres etroits, elles ont chacune une conception 
specifique de la citoyennete. 
A chaque conception nationale de la citoyennete correspond une delimitation particuliere de public et du 
prive. Cette diversite n'est pas sans consequence lorsqu'il s'agit de creer un espace public europeen. 
L'objectif politique de !'Union est de parvenir a articuler des diverses conceptions dans un meme schema. 11 
est done important de bien mesurer la specificite des debats theoriques qui entourent la question de 
!'elaboration de la citoyennete europeenne. 
L'analyse des textes officiels europeens portant sur la citoyennete europeenne, depuis les premieres ebauches 
de definition, montre alors que l'on s'est essentiellement attache a la dimension juridique de la citoyennete: 
- au debut des annees 70, la citoyennete europeenne doit permettre de renforcer la cohesion de la 
Communaute. On cherche done a renforcer le sentiment d'appartenance a la Communaute en octroyant 
des droits a tous les citoyens; 
- a partir de la crise de Maastricht de 1992, elle tend aussi a devenir un facteur de legitimation 
democratique; mais les propositions formulees pour renforcer sa definition lors de la CIG de 1996 ne visent 
qu'a conforter sa dimension juridique, par l'octroi de nouveaux droits, sans tenir compte des dimensions 
sociologique (l'attitude citoyenne) et culturelle (reconnaissance de la specificite culture lie) de la citoyennete. 
Pourtant la citoyennete juridique est aussi appelee "passive". Car la crise du lien social que subissent 
divers Etats membres de l'UE montre qu'elle favorise one attitude clienteliste des citoyens a l'egard de 
l'Etats et renforce l'individualisme. Tandis que le pluralisme des societes europeennes augmente et que le 
phenomene de multi-appartenance se complexifie, cette conception passive de la citoyennete produit une 
inflation des droits individuels qui mine les bases de la <citoyennete>. Elle tend, paradoxalement a sa 
fonction prerniere, a affaiblir le sentiment de la <co-responsabilite> des citoyens et la cohesion de !'ensemble. 
Les limites d'une telle conception essentiellement juridique de la citoyennete semblent alors d'autant plus 




















evidentes au niveau europeen que les appartenances identitaires restent tres fortes: lors de la ratification de 
Traite de Maastricht, les citoyens europeens ont exprime leur souci que ces specificites culturelles soient 
mieux representees et par la meme preservees. 
L'integration des dimensions sociologique et culturelle de la citoyennete mettrait davantage l'accent sur le 
besoin de <reconnaissance> de la specificite d'autrui ou d'un autre groupe d'appartenance, et favoriserait la 
responsabilisation reciproque du citoyen et de la collectivite. 
Cet elargissement de la notion de citoyennete europeenne se ferait alors par: 
- un renouvellement des modes de representation; 
- une activation de la participation des citoyens au sein des corps intermediaires ( qui facilitent la 
representation des divers interets). 
On passerait d'une conception <passive> de la citoyennete a une conception <active>. 
Depuis plus d'une decennie les politologues anglo-saxons reflechissent aux moyens de renforcer le 
citoyennete juridique par une conception plus active de la citoyennete. Mais en Europe, cette notion de 
citoyennete <active> releve, encore aujourd'hui, du domaine de la prospective: les propositions elaborees pour 
renforcer la citoyennete europeenne lors de la CIG de 1996 appartiennent encore au registre de la citoyennete 
juridique. L'analyse des debats anglo-saxons permettrait done de donner de nouvelles perspectives au projet 
europeen car ils attirent l'attention sur le role de la societe civile: il s'agirait d'analyser dans quelle mesure 
on peut pallier la crise de lien social dans les Etats membres de l'Union europeenne et le crise de legitimite 
des institutions europeennes par l'integration de la notion de <citoyennete active> au sein du projet 
europeen". 




















Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo 
• • • 
En posant la question des droits sociaux, nous touchons d'emblee a tout !'ensemble des droits qui s'expriment 
dans la "citoyennete". Approfondir cette citoyennete dans le cadre de l'Union ne pourra etre, pour chaque 
pays, qu'une occasion d'aller plus loin dans sa propre citoyennete. 
Si l' evolution des droits sociaux dans les pays de l 'Union oblige celle-ci a faire un pas decisif dans sa 
construction, ce n'est que dans le cadre de ses competences que sa responsabilite s'exprimera. Plus 
qu'ailleurs, les droits sociaux epousent le diversifie, le multiple dans l'espace de l'Union: les responsabilites 
des Etats membres en sortent renforcees. 
A travers l'histoire de l'Union, la citoyennete a graduellement pris corps. Une etape juridique importante a 
ete consignee dans le Traite de Maastricht. Mais l'Union pratique deja le respect et la promotion de la 
dimension sociale de la citoyennete. Le Parlement et la Commission y ont pose des jalons, le premier a 
travers ses propositions concemant les droits fondamentaux (1989-1996), la deuxieme a travers les differents 
volets de politiques sociales qu'elle stimule ou coordonne, et surtout par la charte sociale, dont l'initiative lui 
revient. 
Ces droits sociaux qui s'enchevetrent avec les droits civiques et qui explicitent la citoyennete ne peuvent 
avoir, aux yeux du comite, qu'une suite: la proposition d'un "bill of rights" doit devenir une cible importante 
dans l'evolution de l'Union. C'est pourquoi le comite propose, dans une premiere etape, c'est-a-dire pendant 
la prochaine conference intergouvemementale, que soient integres des droits fondamentaux sociaux et 
civiques dans le traite et que soit ainsi rendu explicite l'engagement de l'Union dans la formulation d'un "bill 
ofrights" qui puisse nous guider a l'aube du XXIe siecle. 
Une fois ces propositions incluses dans le traite, le comite recommande que ce travail s'acheve au cours d'une 
seconde etape qu'il considere d'une importance capitale pour le future de l'Union: il s'agit de parfaire le "bill 
of rights" encore embryonnaire. Par l'interet immediat et direct qu'un tel processus peut susciter, il 
dynamisera !'engagement des citoyens europeens, des groupes sociaux et economiques, bref de la societe 
civile de tousles pays de l'Union. 
Ainsi, pour le comite, le defi actuel ne consiste pas uniquement a amender, dans le domaine qui lui revient, 
telle ou telle disposition des traites. 11 s'agit d'un autre souffle, d'une autre ampleur. 11 s'agit d'une veritable 
refondation de l'Union europeenne. Relever ce defi est l'exigence du temps present et la garantie d'un nouvel 
eveil des Europeens a leur appartenance, en tant que citoyens, a l 'Union. 




















6 Pluralisme et Diversite 
Simone Veil, Debats du Parlement europeen, le 18 juin 1987. 
"Les femmes dans les institutions communautaires" 
• • • 
Monsieur le President, je suis la cinquieme femme a m'exprimer dans ce debat. Je crois qu'il est fort rare, 
dans cette enceinte, de constater que les femmes ont un peu la priorite pour le droit de parole. Je crois que si 
elles l'ont eue cette fois si facilement, c'est parce que, sans doute, nos collegues masculins n'etaient pas tres 
desireux d'intervenir, sinon certaines d'entre nous auraient eu beaucoup plus de mal a obtenir ces quelques 
minutes. 
( ... ) 
Concernant le probleme qui nous occupe,je dirais que la situation generate ne s'est guere amelioree. C'est ici 
meme, lorsqu'on a vote les nouvelles designations de responsabilites au sein de notre Parlement, que Mme 
Dury, ou Mme Lizin, je ne sais plus tres bien, a souligne que, dans notre Parlement meme, la proportion des 
parlementaires femmes qui exer9aient des responsabilites depuis 1984 avait diminue par rapport ace qu'elle 
etait auparavant. Ence qui concerne la place de la femme dans les institutions communautaires, je crois que 
Mme Van den Heuvel a dit tout ce qu'il y avait a dire, et ce n'est pas la premiere fois, helas, qu'on le dit. 
D'ailleurs ce debat meme aurait du etre inutile. 
( ... ) 
Pourtant, malheureusement, les institutions communautaires sont a l'image de ce qui se passe dans nos pays, 
qu'il s'agisse d'instances politiques, d'entreprises, ou de postes de responsabilites dans tousles secteurs. 
Madame Larive-Groenendaal, que je remplace aujourd'hui parce qu'elle a ete appelee a d'autres fonctions 
pour soutenir l'Europe dans d'autres enceintes, m'a chargee de vous dire qu'elle a fait une enquete, tres 
recemment, dans les entreprises et institutions des Pays-Bas. Celles-ci, chaque annee, publient un rapport 
social soumis a un jury de la maison d'edition VNU, qui decerne un prix pour le meilleur rapport social de 
l'annee. Elle a voulu savoir si on pretait explicitement attention a la position des employees feminines, et si 
cela s'exprimait dans les rapports annuels sociaux, de preference dans un chapitre separe. Elle n'a re9u que 
tres peu de reponses positives, car on lui a repondu que tout va bien, que tout est fait comme il faut, et qu'on 
ne fait pas de distinction de race ni de religion, ni de sexe, et qu'en consequence il n'y avait pas lieu d'en tenir 
compte dans une rubrique particuliere dans le rapport social. 
Je crois que l'effort est a faire partout. 11 suffit de nous rendre dans quelques reunions a uncertain niveau de 
responsabilite, pour s' apercevoir que, tres souvent, nous sommes seules parmi des hommes ou bien il y a 
l'employee, destinee a passer le the, OU la stenotypiste, a laquelle on adresse a peine la parole. Voila quelle 
est la situation aujourd'hui dans la plupart des enceintes ou sont reunies normalement des femmes et des 
hommes, mais ou ce sont generalement les hommes qui exercent des responsabilites. Alors je crois que nous 
devons changer les choses dans les institutions, nous devons les changer partout. Et nous savons que nous ne 
pouvons le faire que par le systeme des quotas. Meme si ce systeme nous choque, meme s'il n'est pas 
agreable, d'autant qu'en general il est tres inferieur aux 50% qu'on devrait exiger, nous sommes obliges de 
passer par le systeme des quotas. 11 faut absolument marquer une volonte affirmee, deliberee, si l'on veut 
progresser, car aujourd'hui on regresse plutot. C'est la raison pour laquelle nous voterons l'amendement qui 
a ete depose, afin d'avoir plus de precisions en ce qui concerne le systeme des quotas, pour arriver 
veritablement a un tournant decisif afin qu' on impose les quotas, et cela de fa9on tres scrupuleuse. 




















Dans un document datant de septembre 1995,la cellule de prospective tente d'evaluer 
"l'apport des initiatives de cooperation transfrontalieredans !'integration du continent 
europeen". 
• • • 
Les evenements de 1989 ont ouvert des opportunites et des risques nouveaux pour !'organisation politique du 
continent europeen. En reponse, !'Union a developpe une attitude et une strategie globales a l'egard de 
!'Europe Centrale et Orientate, sous la forme des Accords Europeens et des programmes d'aide aux PECO. En 
parallele, le Conseil Europeen a marque de fac;on permanente une attention toute particuliere aux initiatives 
de cooperation transfrontaliere qui voyaient le jour dans la region: a l'instar des projets developpes apres-
guerre en Europe Occidentale, ces initiatives permettent de rapprocher des gouvemements et des acteurs 
locaux aux relations traditionnellement conflictuelles et de les faire travailler ensemble. 
A la lumiere de cette evolution, la Cellule de Prospective de la Commission Europeenne s'est penchee l'an 
demier sur les principales initiatives de cooperation transfrontaliere nees en Europe Centrale et Orientale 
depuis 1989 pour evaluer leurs realisations et leur potentiel, identifier les acteurs et Jes facteurs qui 
dynamisent ou freinent la concretisation des initiatives et s'interroger sur Jes moyens d'adapter l'approche de 
!'Union Europeenne et de ses Etats membres a leur egard. 
( ... ) Les champs d'application de ces cooperations transfrontalieres sont nombreux et divers. Pour 
l'essentiel, il est possible de distinguer cinq grands domaines: les reseaux d'infrastructures, la creation d'un 
cadre favorable aux relations d'affaires, l'environnement et !'exploitation concertee des ressources naturelles, 
les echanges culturels et l'education, la creation d'instruments de gestion des tensions ethniques. Cependant, ii 
faut rappeler que meme si elles recelent un fort potentiel economique et politique, les initiatives etudiees sont 
toutes caracterisees par une grande jeunesse; par consequent, Jes exemples de realisations concretes soot 
encore rares. 
Ces cooperations transfrontalieres vont a plusieurs titres dans lessens des interets de l'Union Europeenne 
dans la region. Avant tout, d'un point de vue politique, ces cooperations soot le complement pratique du 
processus diplomatique d'integration de la Grande Europe. Par ailleurs, elles contribuent a ameliorer 
quantitativement et qualitativement le developpement economique de la zone. Enfin, !'emergence de ces 
initiatives peut faciliter l'elargissement de l'Union. 
Au total, on peut affirmer que ces cooperations sont susceptibles de jouer dans l'avenir un role important de 
catalyseur, en favorisant la naissance d'interdependances economiques et de solidarites concretes entre les 
differents acteurs de la zone. Ainsi, elles contribueront fortement a !'emergence d'un continuum de prosperite 
et de stabilite politique a l'echelle de continent. 




















7 - Liberte de Circulation 
"L'immigration et l'asile, deux sujets connexes, occupent une place de plus en plus 
importante dans l'ordre du jour politique de l'Union europeenne et de ses Etats membres. 
lls suscitent des debats publics et parlementaires d'une intensite croissante et entraTnent 
meme parfois, des actes de violence totalement contraires aux traditions et aux lois 
europeennes". Une fois le cadre pose, la Commission Europeenne dans une 
communication datant de fevrier 1994 propose un cadre d'actions base sur la cooperation 
et qui reposent sur trois piliers inseparables : agir sur la pression migratoire, maitriser les 
flux migratoires et approfondir les politiques d'integration concernant les immigres legaux. 
• • • 
La presente communication traite aussi, comme le faisait la communication de 1991 sur !'immigration, de 
l'importante question de savoir quelles mesures sont aujourd'hui necessaires pour approfondir les 
politiques d'integration en faveur des immigres legaux. On sait depuis longtemps que l'immigration n'est 
pas un phenomene temporaire et que les hypotheses en ce sens assez repandues dans les annees 50 et 60 
reposaient sur une incomprehension fondamentale de la nature des flux migratoires qui s'etaient etablis apres 
la guerre. Ce qui est plus important encore, c'est que ('immigration a ete un phenomene positif qui a 
procure des avantages economiques et culturels aux pays d'accueil comme aux immigrants eux-memes. 
Certains exigent l'arret complet de !'immigration: ce n'est ni faisable ni souhaitable, ce qui est necessaire, 
c'est une gestion appropriee de la politique d'immigration. La Communaute a toujours ete one entite 
pluriculturelle et pluri-ethnique. Sa diversite enrichit la Communaute elle-meme et tous ses citoyens en 
beneficient, mais elle presente aussi des defis pour la societe toute entiere et pour les communautes 
immigrees. Une approche globale doit done tenir compte de ce fait et aborder, en termes de politiques 
d'integration, le probleme de la presence de ces ressortissants de pays tiers et de leurs familles - qm 
comprennent souvent une deuxieme generation nee dans la Communaute - et des nouveaux immigrants. 
La communication de 1991 sur !'immigration a propose une approche globale fondee sur trois elements 
distincts mais connexes : 
- agir sur la pression migratoire; 
- maitriser la flux migratoires 
- approfondir les politiques d'integration en faveur des immigres legaux. 
Les evenements depuis 1991 n'ont fait que mettre en evidence la sagesse d'une approche pluridisciplinaire 
globale de ce type. Malgre des changements dans la structure des mouvements migratoires, les pression n'ont 
pas diminue globalement et ii est peu probable qu'elles le fassent. A vrai dire, Jes evenements dans les pays 
voisins de l'Union sont plutot de nature a accentuer qu'a reduire les pressions. 
Le climat politique general reste favorable a !'elaboration d'une approche globale. Toutefois, aucune enceinte 
intemationale ne s'est revelee capable jusqu'a present, de rendre une telle politique operationnelle. L'Union a 
les moyens institutionnels de la faire et a d'ailleurs commence a la faire. Les trois elements de base 
mentionnes ci-dessus requierent la meme attention et l'un des defis qui attendent !'Union consiste a trouver' 
le juste equilibre entre eux. S'il y a des desequilibres, c'est la conception meme d'une approche globale qui 
risque d'etre faussee. La philosophie de cette approche est que des mesures de maitrise a court terme, y 
compris pour !'admission, doivent aller de pair avec une cooperation a long terme avec les pays et regions 
d'origine, ainsi qu'avec une politique active en vue de renforcer les droits de ceux qui sejournent deja 
legalement dans les Etats membres. 




















8 - Modele Europeen de Societe 
Le 21 novembre 1986, Jacques Delors, president de la Commission europeenne, 
prononce un discours a l'lnstitut universitaire europeen de Florence, dans le cadre de la 
neuvieme Conference Jean Monnet. II y prend la defense de l'Acte unique europeen qui 
entrera en vigueur au debut 1987, soulignant qu'il donne les armes qui permettront a 
l'economie de retrouver le chemin de la prosperite et de l'emploi. Une economie, precise-t-
il, "au service d'un projet de societe, au service de ce qui unit les Europeens dans leur 
pluralisme" ... 
• • • 
Cette reforme, la premiere de cette importance, du traite de Rome pose( ... ) la base economique et sociale de 
la relance de !'Europe, apres des annees de stagnation. Tous ces objectifs sont indissolublement lies, le grand 
marche, la cooperation technologique, le renforcement du systeme monetaire europeen, la cohesion 
economique et sociale, et la dimension sociale de !'action collective. Le processus qu'ils prevoient va profiter 
de facteurs d'acceleration, mais la realisation de ses objectifs va aussi sans doute se heurter a un certain 
nombre d'obstacles. 
( ... ) Commenc;:ons, pour etre optimistes, par ces facteurs d'acceleration : je pourrais citer en premier la logique 
interne tres forte de la realisation de l'espace sans frontieres. Le grand marche, c'est un peu le jeu de domino, 
la suppression d'une barriere entrainant la levee d'une autre, et ainsi de suite, faisant en sorte que le 
mouvement ne s'arrete pas. Je mentionnerai surtout !'engagement vers cet objectif des chefs d'entreprise ; Max 
Kohnstamm, qui est ici, pourra vous dire que lorsqu'il a ete question du traite de Rome, les chefs d'entreprises 
n'etaient pas parrni les plus grands supporters .. Ils le sont devenus aujourd'hui. Pourquoi ? Paree qu'ils 
appellent de leurs voeux ce grand marche, qui sera demain le cadre nature! de leur activite. Ce grand marche 
leur permettra de mobiliser des moyens superieurs, il leur offrira de nouveaux debouches. Quant aux forces 
syndicales, elles y sont egalement favorables, le congres de la Confederation europeenne des syndicats en 
1985 a fait du grand marche un de ses objectifs prioritaires. Au meme titre, d'ailleurs, et c'est normal, que la 
realisation d'un espace social europeen, au sein duquel les syndicats estiment que se diffuseront les meilleurs 
systemes de protection sociale et d'amelioration des conditions de travail. Les chefs d'entreprise, les 
organisation syndicales, aujourd'hui plus farouches partisans de la relance europeenne que les hommes 
politiques, c'est la la verite. D'ou !'importance que la Commission attache au dialogue social que j'ai lance des 
mon entree en fonctions et qui porte deja ses fruits, l'Acte unique en fait d'ailleurs mention. Cette attente de 
tous les producteurs, patrons ou salaries, nous ne devons pas la decevoir. Si le pas decisif vers ce grand 
marche n'est pas fait, alors je vous le dis, nous perdrions tres vite notre credibilite. Cela signifierait que dans 
une situation caracterisee par une mondialisation croissante de l'economie, les entreprises ne considereraient 
plus la dimension europeenne comme un element de leur strategie. La construction europeenne perdrait tout a 
la fois son moteur et l'une de ses finalites, le progres economique et social. 




















Le 2 fevrier 1987, le president de la Commission europeenne, 
Jacques Delors, definit et defendit l'originalite du "modele europeen" dont la pierre 
angulaire est "l'equilibre entre l'individu et la societe". 
• • • 
( ... ) "11 faut d'abord batir sur du solide et le solide aujourd'hui, c'est l'espace economique common, lieu de 
plus de prosperite economique et de solidarite entre les pays membres. 
Cela ne peut etre realise que si ce grand marche est dote de ce que j'appelle une conscience morale, une 
conscience politique et c'est la la grande chance du modele europeen. Ce modele dont on a dit tant de mal 
ces dernieres annees, mais qui avait su concilier les vertus du marche, l'intervention des autorites 
publiques et le dialogue entre les partenaires sociaux, donnant ainsi sa specificite a l'Europe. 
Cette specificite, on ne la retrouve ni dans les raisons du succes japonais, ni dans le modele americain avec 
ses heurts et malheurs. 
Elle est inscrite au fond de l'identite europeenne et conditionne en profondeur la progression qui par la 
liberation des echanges, la cooperation technologique, le dialogue social et la cooperation monetaire 
devra nous conduire a un espace economique commun. 
( ... ) Le modele europeen dont l'histoire pourtant est chaotique et qui comprend aussi bien Platon qu'Aristote, 
Machiavel que Toqueville, c'est que nous avons !'intuition que l'individu doit pouvoir s'epanouir jusqu'au 
moment ou il nuit a la societe et que la societe doit pouvoir aider l'individu, notamment ceux qui sont les plus 
faibles, jusqu'au moment de l'epanouissement. C'est cet equilibre entre la societe et l'individu qui fait 
l'originalite du modele europeen." 




















En octobre 1988, a !'occasion d'un colloque organise a Paris sur le theme "ldentites 
nationales et conscience collective", le president de la Commission europeenne Jacques 
Delors, apres s'etre attache a defendre "!'Europe de la necessite" definit ce que pourrait 
etre "l'Europe de !'ideal". 
• • • 
Le discours qu'il faudrait tenir, le dialogue necessaire avec les opinions europeennes doivent absolument 
rejeter les tentations d'unification par l'uniformisation. La diversite europeenne est la. Peut-etre vais-je 
vous surprendre, mais nous n'avons pu faire des progres que parce que, dans la conception intellectuelle, nous 
respections cette diversite. 
Cette Europe, fondee d'abord sur la tradition judeo-chretienne, puis sur le siecle des Lumieres, est tres 
diverse. Et cette diversite n'est pas un handicap. Elle apparait au long de l'histoire comme un ferment constant 
de dynamisme des societes europeennes. C'est pourquoi je vois dans cette diversite un moteur et non un 
frein. 
La diversite est done notre loi ( ... ). 
Cette diversite etant posee, il faut quand meme reconnaitre a l'Europe une personnalite, alors que le Grand 
Marche ne la lui donne pas. Il faut done une reference. Mon hypothese de travail -mais ce n'est qu'une 
hypothese de travail - c'est qu'il existe un modele europeen de societe, different des modeles que l'on peut 
voir dans les grands ensembles dominants. Ce modele europeen de societe transcende les partis politiques qui 
se partagent nos opinions nationales et s'affrontent dans nos batailles electorales. A partir de ce modele 
europeen de societe, je voudrais reflechir sur ce que pourrait etre l'Europe de l'ideal, c'est a dire sur les 
valeurs europeennes qui pourraient la fonder( ... ). 
Je crois que l'analyse de l'individualisme demeure un point tres important. Paree que: ou bien cet 
individualisme s'accroitra, nourri par l'hedonisme contemporain, et a ce moment-la la societe deviendra, a 
travers l'Etat, un simple guichet, et ce serait dangereux; ou bien l'individualisme - et on en voit les traces dans 
certains mouvements catholiques, notamment en ltalie - s'attachera a une seule reference du point de vue 
humaniste et des droits de l'Homme, et la societe oubliera la politique, avec ses grandeurs, son sens collectif, 
et ses drames. Ou bien nous arriverons, par une restauration de la vie democratique, a restaurer cet 
equilibre fondamental entre societe et individu. 
Le maintien de la concertation sociale, la sortie des organisations syndicales de la crise profonde qui les 
affecte, le maintien adapte de nos systemes de protection sociale sont une base, un socle. Pourtant, ils ne 
sauraient suffire a redonner au modele europeen sa jeunesse et son sens. Et c'est d'autant plus important 
que lorsqu'on regarde le monde tel qu'il est, on ne peut s'empecher de dire que, en dehors de la construction 
europeenne, quelle autre forme d'aventure collective est offerte a nos contemporains? 11 n'y en a pas d'autre. 
C'est encore la seule qui puisse pour !'instant - j'espere qu'il y en aura d'autres - permettre a nos jeunes 
generations d'esperer qu'elles auront leur place dans la societe - et ¥a commence par un travail - qu'elles 
pourront fraterniser avec d'autres, se connaitre, echanger. C'est le seul projet, c'est la seule aventure 
collective capable de nourrir cette esperance. Elle doit d'abord etre fondee sur la fidelite a ce modele 
europeen de societe. 
Quelles sont alors les references europeennes qui devraient guider le progres de son modele de societe? 
Tout d'abord la creativite. C'est aujourd'hui un des grands enjeux de la competition, pas simplement 
economique, mais politique et culturelle. Dans la societe postindustrielle qui va etre la notre, cette creativite 
devra pouvoir s'exercer sous toutes les formes possibles. 
En second lieu, la diversite. 11 va falloir la cultiver (car) la diversite est un fondement pour surmonter, soit les 




















oppositions entre les Etats-nations, soit les ideologies, soit pour debusquer les arrieres pensees. 
Troisieme element, l'equilibre entre la societe et l'individu. C'est pour moi un element essentiel, et tout en 
pensant que les fondements sont la (avec !'importance de la concertation sociale en plus du marche et d'une 
certaine conception de la solidarite a travers nos systemes de protection sociale), il faut aller plus loin. Il faut 
done penser a la renovation de la democratie . 
11 y a, en effet, quelque chose qui ne va pas dans la democratie, dans la fa9on dont elle fonctionne. Ce n'est 
pas une affaire d'institutions, mais une affaire de comportement, c'est une affaire d'esprit et d'ame de la 
democratie qui est en cause. ( ... ) si nous ne creons pas un mode de participation des citoyens, 
d'interessement a la vie publique, alors je crois que nous n'y parviendrons pas. 
Enfin, le demier element, c'est la solidarite. 




















Le 20 mars 1990, la Commission europeenne devoile un document intitule "Union 
economique et monetaire, fondement economique et conception du systeme". Elle y decrit 
les benefices (et les coats) potentiels d'une telle evolution, et analyse celle-ci a l'aune de 
!'exigence de cohesion. 
• • • 
The likely benefits and costs of EMU may be grouped under five primary headings : 
i) the advantages of price stability. Price stability is of itself beneficial to the economy and it can be 
achieved more surely and durably through a well designed EMU. It can also be achieved at a lesser cost. This 
is well recognised in countries with relatively inflationary histories. It is also true for Germany, since EMU 
offers the surest way of securing price stability in its partners countries, and thus a lesser risk of imported 
inflation; 
ii) achieving a more efficient economy and stronger economy growth compatible with price stability. EMU 
can amplify the kind of cost savings and improved market integration offered by the Single Market. 
European enterprises view a single currency as giving a very positive boost to the European business climate 
by eliminating transactions costs and exchange rate uncertainty. Business optimism can become a self-
fulfilling prophecy. This appears already to be the case with the 1992 process and clear moves towards EMU 
would reinforce these trends ; 
iii) impacts on public finance, concerning the management of national budgets, with advantages for some 
countries through lower interest rate. For several countries a large part of the budget deficit may be accounted 
for by high interest rates which in turn reflect exchange risk premia that EMU could eliminate ; 
iv) impacts on employment and regional balance, given that nominal exchange rate adjustments will be 
excluded. In fact the exchange rate instrument appears rather inefficient, and alternative adjustment policies 
exist. These alternatives would add to the efficiency of an economy and hence further increase the benefits of 
EMU; 
v) impacts on the international economic and monetary system, with advantages from a stronger Community 
presence. Developments in Eastern Europe increase the relevance of the Community establishing a robust 
EMU.( ... ) 
It is essential to ensure that the beneficial effects of economic and monetary union are felt in all parts of the 
Community. Unduly large regional imbalances would pose an economic as well as a political threat to the 
union. The Community's existing instruments are already making a substantial contribution to the cohesion 
objective, as is the greater economic activity associated with the Single Act and the completion of the internal 
market. Pluriannual programmes for the development of backward regions and of those requiring 
reconversion have been established by these regions and cover many aspects that are necessary for the 
adaptation and development of their economies. Concrete experience of this new approach, which was 
adopted by the Council in February 1988, has now begun. At the end of 1991 the Commission will make a full 
assessment or the Structural Policies, and make recommendations on their continuation and further 
improvement. 
The effects of economic and monetary integration may be at least as beneficial for the less developed regions 
as for the more prosperous. A greater amount of inward investment may, for example, be attracted by their 
comparative advantages. Also the trend towards service industries and high-value manufactured products will 
reduce the importance of transport cost in location decisions. However, some historical experience suggests 
that regions within economic and monetary union can be disadvantaged over long periods of time unless 
sufficient measures are taken. 




















In the final stage of EMU there might be a need for further strengthen Community Structural Policies. 
Instruments and resources would be adapted to the needs of the union. In addition, considerations of 
absorptive capacity, as well as more general considerations, may point in favour of widening eligibility 
criteria for support to the least favoured Member States. 
The Community should also develop some mechanism capable of reacting promptly in the event of 
unexpected economic shocks with adversely affect given regions. Some preliminary ideas might include 
endowing the Structural Policies with a greater capacity to respond more quickly and flexibly when specific 
regions or sectors encounter sudden difficulties. 




















"Le modele europeen de societe". C'est le theme d'un seminaire dans la sene des 
"Carrefours de la Science et de la Culture" organise pour le President de la Commission 
par la cellule de prospective, les 25 et 26 septembre 1992 a Lausanne et regroupant des 
intellectuels de tous les Etats membres de la Communaute europeenne. Extraits. 
• • • 
Henri Rieben. economiste et directeur de la fondation Jean Monnet a Lausanne 
"Le ferment de changement que Jean Monnet a voulu introduire dans lhistoire de !Europe, celle de nos 
societes et de nos economies, le souffle d'esprit et d'action qu'il a fait passer a l'origine et qui ne s'est pas 
interrompu jusqu'a nos jours, tout cela est parti d'une vision que Jean Monnet a developpee dans une note de 
reflexion datee du 5 aout 1943, a Alger, qu'il a discutee le 17 octobre avec le general de Gaulle, a la villa des 
Glycines, et dont l'essentiel est cite ci-apres: 
En 1918, nous avons gagne la guerre, mais en 1919, nous avons perdu la paix. 11 faudra, apres la guerre, 
construire une communaute dans laquelle il n'y aura plus ni vainqueur ni vaincu, mais des partenaires 
egaux devant la loi commune. Ce qu'il faut, c'est une societe democratique, une communaute de droit, 
un marche a la mesure des ensembles les plus dynamiques de la planete . 
Le coeur de la preoccupation de Jean Monnet, c'est la personne humaine et le risque de degradation de la 
personne humaine dans une Europe qui repartirait a la derive. 11 faut done une economie a l'echelle du 
continent, dans laquelle l'accomplissement des personnes sera la vraie source de progres. Il faut le respect 
des libertes fondamentales. 11 faut des institutions qui apportent la garantie de !'action dans la duree. 11 faut 
creer, au niveau europeen, un pouvoir d'arbitrage, grace a la representation d'un pouvoir representatif de 
l'interet commun, capable de dialoguer avec les representants des interets nationaux. 11 faut une economie 
dans laquelle les marches ne sont plus ni cartelises ni divises et, par consequent, dans laquelle les patrons ne 
detiennent plus l'essentiel du pouvoir economique, une economie qui associe !'ensemble des forces vives, et en 
particulier la classe ouvriere, au developpement de la societe et de l'economie ainsi qu'a la construction de 
l'Europe ... " 
Marie-Therese Meulders. iuriste, Louvain-la-Neuve(Belgique) 
"11 n'y a pas de modele stable et eternel, celui que nous cherchons est a construire a partir des racines de 
l'histoire. Par rapport aux modeles non occidentaux, il y a un modele occidental de societe qui se caracterise 
par le rationalisme, la secularisation et l'individualisme ... C'est chez nous qu'est ne l'individu, chez nous que 
sont nes l'Etat, la democratie et les droits de l'Homme. Cela, c'est un patrimoine commun. A partir de la, 
le modele s'est fracture en deux, entre l'Europe continentale et le monde anglo-americain, avec un 
individualisme et un liberalisme beaucoup plus fort dans ce demier ... " 
• A propos de solidarite 
Rober Badinter, iuriste. president du Conseil constitutionnel (France) 
"La specificite de l'Europe, c'est l'exigence de solidarite. Meme si elle n'est pas absolue, c'est la plus forte. 
Elle n'est pas absente, tant s'en faut, des societes americaines, notamment au Quebec ( ... ). Mais il y a dans la 
societe europeenne une exigence de solidarite, de protection sociale, de garanties sociales plus affirmee que 
dans la societe des Etats-Unis. II 




















Hartmut Kaelble, historien et philosophe (Allemagne) 
"Dans l'histoire du temps present, la societe europeenne peut offrir cinq formes de solidarite: la famille, le 
milieu social, l'Etat providence, la democratie et la solidarite entre nations europeennes. 
( ... ) L'Etat providence est une specificite europeenne. Ence qui conceme la democratie, en Europe, elle n'a 
jamais ete - ou tres rarement - une democratie communautaire, une democratie directe, mais plut6t une 
defense contre l'Etat, contre l'Eglise, une defense des libertes et des droits de l'Homme contre ces institutions. 
Quant a la solidarite entre nations, c'est une specificite europeenne tres importante, qui a emerge apres la 
Seconde Guerre mondiale, avec ce contr6le mutuel par la supranationalite qu'on ne trouve pas dans l'idee du 
melting pot americain et qu'on ne trouve pas non plus dans le systeme de protection des minorites en Europe 
de l'Est. C'est vraiment une specificite et, me semble-t-il, un modele exportable, cette forme de coexistence 
entre nations n'etant apparue dans aucune autre societe." 
• A propos de valeurs 
Helena Vaz da Silva. iournaliste et administrateur (Portugal) 
"Les libertes, la toute puissance de la raison, l'esprit critique ... , voila des valeurs indiscutablement 
europeennes. L'economie de marche, c'est autre chose, l'Etat providence aussi, qui est un avatar des valeurs 
europeennes ... Mais l'idee qu'on puisse construire l'Europe en faisant retour au passe, en s'appuyant sur une 
espece de volontarisme naff ne nous menera probablement pas tres loin. Pourquoi ne pas donner la preference 
a une autre interpretation des valeurs europeennes et mettre l'accent sur la curiosite, le gout du risque et de 
la nouveaute ainsi que l'utilisation systematique du doute comme moyen de progression et forme de 
connaissance? 
On parle trop souvent de l'Europe comme d'une realite figee, arretee, et comme s'il ne s'agissait que de 
reprendre les cartes et de les redistribuer. Nous ne tenons pas suffisamment compte de ce qui est en marche, 
comme ces migrants qui nous arrivent de tousles cotes et changent la face de l'Europe. Nous ne sommes deja 
plus entre nous et ce que nous appelons aujourd'hui minorites deviendront des majorites. Tenons compte du 
fait que l'acces du grand nombre au marche de la consommation, au vote et au marche de la culture, fait que le 
gout et l'imaginaire changent ... " 




















Dans une communication au Conseil de l'Union europeenne datee de Decembre 1992, la 
Commission europeenne rappelait la necessite d'orienter la construction europeenne 
"Vers une Europe des solidarites" et developpait des propositions pour "intensifier la lutte 
centre !'exclusion sociale et promouvoir !'integration". 
• • • 
La Communaute a exprime en diverses occasions !'importance qu'elle attache a la solidarite et a la cohesion 
sociale, et sa volonte de contribuer, dans les limites modestes de ses moyens et de ses competences, aux 
efforts entrepris. 
La communaute ne saurait en effet se desinteresser, dans le contexte des perspectives ouvertes a la realisation 
progressive de l'Union Economique et Monetaire et de l'Union Politique, des situations qui temoignent, par 
leur existence et leur ampleur, de la necessite d'une construction europeenne equilibree, c'est a dire qui 
associe a ses preoccupations economiques le souci de sa cohesion inteme et de sa dimension sociale. 
Le projet d'integration europeenne ne saurait mobiliser le plus grand nombre s'il ne developpait pas ce qu'il est 
convenu d'appeler sa dimension sociale, a laquelle sont notamment attaches non seulement les Etats membres 
et les institutions communautaires, mais aussi les organisations professionnelles, les organisations non-
gouvemementales, et une large majorite des opinions publiques nationales. Celles-ci ont exprime recemment, 
de manieres diverses, leurs preoccupations a cet egard ( ... ). 
Dans le cadre de la mise en oeuvre du principe de subsidiarite, la Communaute ne saurait en la matiere se 
substituer aux Etats membres. Eu egard a la responsabilite des Etats membres et de leurs autorites nationales, 
regionales et locales, la valeur ajoutee de l'action communautaire peut etre situee a quatre niveaux: 
• la Communaute peut contribuer a l'elaboration et au transfert de methodes et de savoir-faire 
appropries aux formes actuelles de l'exclusion, a l'identification des bonnes pratiques, a la formation 
et au soutien de reseaux d'acteurs pouvant echanger leurs experiences et developper des initiatives 
concertees au niveau europeen, et a l'enrichissement du debat. 
• la Communaute doit egalement, dans une perspective de coherence, rappeler les developpements 
positifs de ses politiques, et analyser l'impact de ces dernieres au regard de la lutte contre l'exclusion 
sociale. 
• la Communaute peut contribuer au traitement de certains problemes qui, par leur nature, depassent le 
niveau national comme par exemple ceux de certains groupes ou minorites, tels les gens du voyage. 
• la Communaute peut contribuer a l'affirmation des valeurs qui sont communes aux Etats membres, 
notamment en ce qui concerne le respect de la dignite humaine. 




















Nomme President de la Commission europeenne quelques semaines plus tot, Jacques 
Santer se presenta devant le Parlement europeen - qui devait confirmer son investiture -
le 17 janvier 1995. Dans son discours, ii proposa une vision de !'Europe resolument tournee 
vers l'avenir. 
• • • 
Education and training will derive direct benefit from the information society, a real technological 
revolution. 
The potential of this revolution is gigantic: it means markets representing billions of ECU's, huge gains in 
competitiveness, new status-enhancing jobs, enormous progress in medicine and education. The current 
progress is irreversible and universal. Rather than submit to it we must direct it. I want the Union to be at the 
fore with European technologies, products and services. 
Technological progress must contribute to cultural and linguistic diversity in Europe. We will therefore 
also have to develop a strategy concerning content. I want to see European traffic on the global information 
highways. But that does not mean that access to networks and services should be limited to the most fortunate 
sections of society. If we are not careful, knowledge will divide us. Whereas we want the opposite, we want it 
to unite us. 
( ... ) Competitiveness, growth, yes! But I do not want economic growth which leaves part of our population 
out. I do not want growth which widens the gap between regions. I certainly do not want growth which 
destroys the environment for us today and for our children. On the contrary, I want growth which 
implies social solidarity, regional solidarity and solidarity with future generations. This is necessary for 
reasons of fairness, justice and morality, of course. But also, I repeat, for the sake of economic prosperity. 
( ... ) The challenge of poverty and exclusion is just as big. In Europe the ranks of the poor, the badly-housed 
and the excluded are on the increase. This is intolerable. I am not asking for new powers for the Commission. 
But the fight against social exclusion is a duty which transcends institutional quarrels. I am prepared to 
explore all possibilities, in whatever context, in the search for remedies. I will never tire of repeating that the 
European project is a comprehensive one and regional solidarity is an integral part of it. 
( ... ) I think there is another wider type of solidarity, namely our duty to future generations. I touched on this 
when I mentioned education, reducing public deficits and large networks. I would like to consider it from the 
point of view of sustainable development, that is development which meets today's needs without 
jeopardising future generations' chances of meeting their needs. This will also involve discussing our 
quality of life in the wider sense. 
We must make a success of the transition towards a more environment-friendly economy. We have come to 
realise that economic performance is itself dependent on making the best use of our natural resources. By 
staying at the leading edge of environmental protection, we will actually be creating new jobs. 
I think action should proceed on three fronts. First, we must enforce the existing rules. Our Community is 
founded on respect for the rule of law and the Commission is the guardian of the Treaties. Second, we must 
incorporate an environmental dimension into other policies. Third, as proposed by the Commission, we 
must introduce green accounting in the Member States and the Union. 
Quality of life: for over 70 % of the Union's population this means the quality of urban life. The alarming 
increase in problems connected with social deprivation, crime and pollution in many of our towns and 
cities obliges us to reflect carefully on these problems. With due regard for the principle of subsidiarity, what 
we need is an overall vision of urban problems and the various instruments which we have or could develop 
at Community level as well as at national, regional and local level. ( ... ) The regeneration of rural areas and 
smaller towns is another priority area concerning the quality of life." 




















La solidarite est le veritable "federateur de l'Europe". C'est ce que le president de la 
Commission, Jacques Santer, s'emploie a demontrer lors de la ceremonie d'ouverture de 
l'annee academique 1995-1996 au College d'Europe de Natolin, en Pologne, le 26 
septembre 1995. 
• • • 
Un dialogue permanent pour resoudre des problemes communs : c'est tout simplement l'alchimie qui fait vivre 
la Communaute europeenne depuis pres de quarante ans. Et le fruit de ce dialogue, comme sa forme meme, 
c'est la solidarite entre des pays qui ( ... ) n'ont, de ce fait, pas besoin de gouvemement central. 
Nous retombons ici sur les valeurs ( ... ). Si la methode elle-meme est solidaire, les resultats le sont aussi, et ils 
traduisent ce fonds commun de civilisation que nous partageons tous, et que vous allez bient6t partager avec 
nous au jour le jour. 
Ce point est particulierement important a comprendre dans la periode de transition economique et politique 
que vit actuellement la Pologne, comme les autres pays d'Europe centrale et orientale. 11 y a, en effet, une 
maniere diffuse, souvent mal exprimee, une crainte qui saisit les peuples, et qu'exploitent certains hommes 
politiques, devant la notion "d'economie de marche" : comme si !'integration a !'Europe etait synonyme de 
liberalisme absolu, de laisser-faire, de concurrence achamee entre les hommes, les villes, les regions, les pays 
meme. En fait, ce n'est pas la la vision de !'Europe, et ce n'est pas sa pratique. 
Certes, nous estimons que les echanges sont necessaires, que la concurrence est saine, que la liberte 
d'entreprendre est indispensable a la prosperite de tous. Certes, nous croyons qu'une economie modeme ne 
peut etre centralisee par un Etat, quel que soit son genie. Mais cela ne va pas sans conditions prealables et 
sans correctifs. 
C'est pour cela que nous avons invente les Fonds structurels. Contrairement a une idee re<;ue, l'idee ne date 
pas d'hier: le Fonds social europeen etait prevu des le Traite de Rome, le Fonds de developpement regional a 
ete mis au point en 1974 pour aider les regions en retard de developpement, le Fonds d'orientation et de 
garantie agricole a ete institue en meme temps que la politique agricole commune. Dans les trois cas, on a fait 
jouer les solidarites entre les pays, les plus riches acceptant de contribuer financierement au developpement 
des autres, ou d'adoucir les consequences sociales des restructurations economiques necessaires. Ce genre de 
mecanisme qui est connu des Etats federaux, est en general totalement absent des accords intemationaux : que 
je sache, ni !'accord de libre-echange nord-americain, ni le traite institutif du Mercosur ne presentent de telles 
caracteristiques, qui sont done bien specifiquement europeennes. 
De meme, dans le domaine social, !'Europe n'est plus, Dieu merci, ni celle d'Oliver Twist ni celle de Karl 
Marx. Le dialogue social est etabli dans !'immense majorite de nos Etats membres. Dans les entreprises 
multinationales, un comite d'entreprise europeen a ete institue, pour permettre la consultation des salaries sur 
les decisions de gestion qui peuvent les affecter. Une "Charte sociale" a ete mise au point, fixant les principes 
qui doivent regir les rapports sociaux au sein des entreprises. Des directives ont ete adoptees sur la securite 
des travailleurs sur les lieux de travail. Des organisations representatives des syndicats se sont constituees au 
niveau europeen, et des responsables syndicaux siegent au Comite economique et social europeen, instance 
consultative amenee a donner son avis sur tout texte a caractere economique ou social. 
C'est dire que !'Europe ne neglige pas, loin s'en faut, la solidarite et la cohesion sociales. Certes, il faut 
garder un certain equilibre ; les pays contributeurs ont des contraintes budgetaires qu'il faut prendre en compte 
; syndicats et patronat doivent trouver des compromis pour que les choses avancent et que les reformes 
puissent se faire ; mais c'est dans un esprit de solidarite que cela se fait. Et pour vous, peuple de Pologne, 
c'est une garantie fondamentale. 




















Dans le meme discours de Natolin, le president Santer evoque le defi le plus fondamental 
qui doit etre releve, celui du chomage. II ne pourra l'etre, argumente-t-il, que par un effort 
collectif de convergence - qui, rien que sous cet angle, justifie les regles de discipline 
inspirees par la marche vers l'Union economique et monetaire- et de creativite. 
• • • 
Mais le defi le plus redoutable que nous ayons a affronter en termes de solidarite est celui du ch6mage. Le 
nombre de ch6meurs atteint actuellement le chiffre effrayant de 18 millions dans la seule Union europeenne. 
Ace niveau, ce n'est pas d'une "crise" passagere qu'on parle : c'est d'une veritable mutation, d'une difficulte 
d'adaptation de !'ensemble de l'appareil productif europeen aux conditions du monde modeme. Sur ce point, 
j'ai deux convictions profondes. 
La premiere est que nous devons exorciser les tentations du "chacun pour soi". Devaluations competitives, 
retour aux protections de toute nature, accroissement des deficits budgetaires, aides massives aux entreprises 
en difficulte. Toutes ces pretendues recettes ne sont que des mirages. Sans un effort d'assainissement des 
finances publiques, la ponction sur l'epargne sera trop importante, les taux d'interet monteront, 
l'investissement et la consommation sont paralyses d'autant, et des perturbations monetaires interviendront de 
surcroit, dans la mesure ou la coordination des politiques economiques ne sera pas effective. Je ne suis pas en 
train de plaider pour le respect des "criteres de convergence" fixes par le Traite de Maastricht : je decris tres 
simplement un mecanisme economique connu et verifiable qui justifie certes notre effort de convergence au 
sein de l'Europe, mais qui peut egalement interesser directement la Pologne dans la gestion de ses affaires 
economiques. Nos economies sont a ce point liees entre elles que la convergence economique, en dehors 
meme de tout traite, devient une regle de bonne gestion et, je dirais, de bon sens. Dans !'adhesion que vous 
preparez, cette observation est capitale : les regles sont <lures, mais nous pouvons les respecter, et nous en 
retirerons collectivement de grands benefices. 
Ma seconde remarque -et la je sors un peu de mon role de president de la Commission- est que les Etats 
devraient et pourraient etre plus imaginatifs dans le traitement du ch6mage. Je ne parle pas du traitement 
social, qui est genereusement assume, et a quels frais, par la quasi totalite de nos systemes de protection 
sociale. Mais fait-on assez pour elargir le marche des petites et moyennes entreprises, ou se creeront les 
emplois de demain ? Facilite-t-on suffisamment leur creation ? Ne pourrait-on, comme on l'a fait dans 
certaines regions, etablir entre les PME et les grandes entreprises regionales des liens de partenariat et de 
cooperation, celles-ci aidant celles-la a ameliorer leur gestion et a chercher de nouveaux debouches ? Que 
fait-on pour faciliter la creation d'entreprises individuelles ? Agit-on suffisamment pour susciter les emplois 
de services, notamment les emplois sociaux, dont le besoin se fait de plus en plus sentir, notamment chez les 
personnes agees ou dependantes ? Investit-on convenablement dans la formation des jeunes et dans la 
formation continue, elements essentiels de !'amelioration du marche du travail ? Est-ce que nous nous 
preparons suffisamment aux emplois de demain, qui se situeront probablement en grand nombre dans les 
secteurs nouveaux de la societe de !'information, de l'environnement, de la gestion urbaine ? Voila quelques 
questions qui sont autant de pistes de reflexion pour les Etats membres, mais aussi pour vous, qui voulez 
adherer a l'Union europeenne, et qui avez aussi a reflechir a ce que c'est qu'une politique de plein emploi dans 
un monde de plus en plus concurrentiel ou les mouvements technologiques, financiers et meme culturels et 
sociaux s'accelereront de maniere ineluctable. 




















A la fin du mois de mars 1996, la Commission europeenne reunit la "societe civile" a 
Bruxelles dans le cadre d'un "Forum social europeen". Son president, Jacques Santer, 
profite de !'occasion pour reaffirmer la specificite du modele europeen de societe, 
notamment a !'intention des pays candidats a !'adhesion. 
• • • 
Se referer au modele europeen de societe est un element essentiel d'identification pour l'Union europeenne, a 
l'interieur, comme vis-a-vis de l'exterieur. Je pense particulierement aux pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale, 
aujourd'hui candidats a l'entree dans l'Union europeenne, mais heritiers depuis longtemps des memes valeurs. 
Si cette ouverture ne doit pas etre une dilution, cette zone de libre-echange que certains redoutent, alors il 
nous faut bien clarifier notre identite, notre projet, en particulier par !'expression de normes sociales et 
environnementales. 
11 ne faut y voir aucun repli sur nous memes, mais bien au contraire le souci d'une reponse faite a un besoin 
d'ancrage democratique. Cet ancrage ne peut se limiter a la seule dynamique de liberalisation des echanges. 
Affirmer le projet europeen, affirmer sa dimension sociale et la modemite de celle-ci, ne se separe pas de 
l'enjeu de securite que les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale attachent a leur adhesion a l'Union europeenne. 
Au bout du compte, les Europeens ne seront prets a prendre des risques les uns pour les autres que s'ils se 
sentent ensemble relies par cette forme d'appartenance que cree un attachement commun aux garanties reelles 
de la liberte et de la <lignite humaine. 




















Les 28 et 29 avril, la Commission europeenne organise une "Table ronde sur l'emploi" qui 
permet aux partenaires sociaux des Quinze Etats membres de prendre position sur le 
"Pacte europeen de confiance pour l'emploi" dont l'idee a ete lancee par le president 
Jacques Santer. En conclusion des travaux, le commissaire Padraig Flynn souligne la 
necessite que tous les acteurs -pouvoirs publics, patronat et syndicats- s'attellent a la 
tache. 
• • • 
At first sight, I can see three areas where significant progress could be made at European level : 
• flexibility, in its positive sense, I mean reconciling the needs for companies to adapt and workers' 
needs for security. The employment relationship, its adaptation to the new forms of employment, that 
is clearly your responsibility. It is for you to give effect to the Essen conclusions ; 
• access by young people to employment : it has been stated repeatedly that Europe cannot deprive itself 
of this source of prosperity. Business has a social role -I would even say a moral duty- in this 
connection. We have to translate our words into deeds and take up the challenge building new and 
solid pathways from school to work for young people. The Commission will support your initiatives in 
this area, including the necessary changes to be made ; 
• vocational training, you have already done a lot of work here and the significant achievements now 
need to be reaffirmed and exploited. Let's find a formula to tum these achievements into a "framework 
ofreference", a groundwork on which we can build. 
You raised the question of the role of the Structural Funds in this context, and rightly so. We have to improve 
our capacity to take preventive action -and we cannot do that without your co-operation. 
What we have to do, in each of these areas, is to look to the future and( ... ) adopt measures with an eye to the 
challenges of the future. The Commission has laid down a number of guidelines which have contributed to 
this long-term view : the Communication on the future of social protection and the Green Paper on the 
information society. I hope that these contributions will also prove useful in your work. 
A number of speakers looked to the public authorities (both national and Community), calling on them to 
adhere to commitments made. I agree : in regard to employment, we need to be demanding -also on ourselves. 
Your demands will be all the more powerful and more credible if you have mapped out the route you propose 
to take for these reciprocal commitments in the areas of your responsibilities, without which no vigorous, 
sustained measures can be made. ( ... ). 
If the idea of an European pact is to succeed, then all the parties must be willing to enter into concrete 
commitments. 
If the social partners at European level wish to be part of the solution we are all seeking to find, then they 
must play their role by the entering into specific undertakings which demonstrate their common commitment 
to the path of radical but negotiated structural change of which nearly every participants has spoken. 
Otherwise you are condemned to remain only a part of the problem. And -to speak frankly- you too will have 
to accept your share of responsibilities for the consequences of any failure. 
As Commissioner responsible for social affairs, and accordingly also for the social dialogue, I expect to hear 
from you, in the next few days, weeks or months, the practical contributions you will propose, so that you 
become joint players in this process which you have endorsed. 




















Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo 
• • • 
L'Etat europeen est un Etat social, et cela bien avant que les Etats ne s'integrent dans l'Union. Ils on tous 
apporte avec eux le sens de la responsabilite de collectivite face aux besoins des citoyens. Quoique, dans 
l'histoire de chaque pays, des cherninements specifiques aient conduit a des formes differentes dans l'exercice 
de cette responsabilite, dans tous les Etats de l 'Union, les droits sociaux sont, a des degres differents sans 
doute, respectes, defendus et promus. D'ou un espace commun qui a deja une dimension sociale. 
Le moment est venu de rassembler ce qui, dans ce volet social, est deja codifie et, simultanement, d'entamer 
le processus vers la codification de ce qui, dans cet espace commun, correspond aux aspirations et aux besoins 
des Europeens. Certes, l'Etat social est aujourd'hui sous attaque et nettement en crise, mais cela ne veut pas 
dire qu'il faille renoncer a ses principes. Au contraire, il faut trouver des conditions nouvelles pour le 
repenser, car il est l 'expression du "souci de l 'autre", de la valorisation des ressources humaines et, de ce fait, 
dynarnisateur, en profondeur, de la competitivite a visage humain. 
Si "mode le social europeen" il y a, c 'est aussi au niveau de la mise en commun des experiences des differents 
systemes nationaux que de nouvelles percees pourront etre trouvees. C'est dire que la reflexion sur les droits 
sociaux et leur mise en oeuvre dans les conditions du monde d'aujourd'hui doivent avoir la place qui leur 
revient dans l'edifice de l'Union europeenne. 
La mise en oeuvre du marche unique, s'achevant dans l'Union economique et monetaire, constitue un objectif 
cible qui a conduit a la mobilisation et a la reorganisation des acteurs econorniques des pays de l 'Union 
europeenne. De meme, le declenchement ferme d'un processus conduisant a l'union sociale europeenne 
deviendra un objectif capable de faire progresser la construction de l'Union. 
L'urgence est la: a la fois inteme et exteme. Inteme parce qu'il s'agit de la securite de la vie des Europeens 
qu'il faut assurer face aux questions posees par le phenomene persistant qu'est la rarete du travail ainsi que 
face aux nouvelles donnees demographiques. Urgence exteme aussi parce que la position economique de 
l 'Union dans le marche mondial ainsi que l' efficacite de notre aide au developpement passe avant tout par la 
possibilite d'offrir de nouveaux "modeles" qui permettent a chaque pays de trouver ses propres voies pour une 
societe a la fois de progres economique et de justice sociale. 
La question sociale qui, au debut de l'industrialisation, s'exprimait surtout dans les rapports capital-travail, 
s'est enrichie. Y ont contribue, a la fois, le changement radical des composantes de la production et 
l' emergence de droits sociaux couvrant pratiquement tous les aspects des conditions de vie des personnes. 
Droits civiques et droits sociaux deviennent interdependants. Dans la tradition europeenne, les droits sociaux 
et les droits civiques sont inseparables. C'est "la liberte et les conditions de la liberte", c'est le visage en 
miroir de "democratie et developpement". 




















9 - ldentite Europeenne 
Simone Veil, President du Parlement europeen, Florence le 27 novembre 1980 
"La communaute et l'identite europeenne" 
• • • 
Prendre conscience de l'identite europeenne, c'est non seulement prendre conscience de notre Communaute 
de destin dans le monde instable et dangereux ou nous vivons, c'est non seulement prendre conscience de la 
chance, que nous devons defendre et meriter, de vivre en hommes libres, c' est aussi retrouver le sens des 
valeurs culturelles qui fondent l 'humanisme europeen. 
De fa9on paradoxale, on peut se demander si cet humanisme europeen n'est pas aujourd'hui en declin par 
comparaison a ce qu'il a ete dans le passe. Au Moyen-Age, a l'epoque de la Renaissance, au dix-huitieme 
siecle et meme au-dela, malgre les guerres qui dechiraient l'Europe, les artistes, les philosophes, les hommes 
de science avaient sans doute des contacts plus etroits qu'aujourd'hui. 
Certes, si !'esprit europeen s'est manifeste, a certaines epoques du passe, avec plus de vigueur 
qu'aujourd'hui, c'est qu'il ne concemait qu'une elite reduite en nombre et qui disposait, ne serait-ce que par 
la pratique du latin, de moyens de communication qui rendaient souvent nos humanistes plus proches les uns 
des autres, quelle que soit leur nationalite d'origine, que de leurs concitoyens paysans ou marchands. 11 n'en 
reste pas moins qu'autour de quelques poles, de quelques hauts-lieux, dont Florence est l'un des plus 
prestigieux, il existait ce qu'on pourrait appeler un champ culture!, ou s'elaboraient et se diffusaient les 
grands mouvements de pensee dont nous avons herite. 
Sans doute aussi le monde culture! occidental etait-il plus limite dans son espace geographique, aussi bien par 
le nombre d'hommes et femmes qu'il concemait, mais n'oublions pas que Diderot ne craignait pas de rendre 
visite a Catherine II de Russie et que les itineraires des compagnons les conduisaient bien loin de leur pays 
d'origine. 
Une culture veritable et vivante est faite d'un tissu de connaissances, d'impressions, d'elements conscients ou 
impalpables. Elle implique non seulement une ouverture d'esprit et une curiosite, mais des contacts frequents 
et prolonges, des echanges, une permeabilite entre les hommes et les oeuvres. Elle est faite aussi 
d'engagements, de convictions, de foi. Elle est science, elle est aussi elan. 
Cette complexite qui donne sa richesse a l'acquis culture! authentique ecarte toute idee de creer 
artificiellement une culture, mais si nous ne devons pas nourrir d'illusions excessives sur nos capacites a 
mettre en place toutes les conditions d'un nouvel humanisme europeen, il faut nous attacher a promouvoir et a 
soutenir toutes les initiatives propres a donner sa pleine dimension a une Europe de I' esprit. 
Beaucoup d'actions sont envisageables a cet egard. Dans le domaine d'abord de la conversation de notre 
patrimoine culture! commun et de sa meilleure connaissance par nos citoyens. Comment ne pas evoquer ici, 
avec emotion, l'apport exceptionnel de l'Italie, et en particulier de la Toscane et de Florence, a la culture 
universelle ? Comment ne pas affirmer egalement l'imperieuse necessite de mieux proteger un patrimoine 
irrempla9able ? A mes yeux, le Parlement europeen devrait trouver la le champ d'action d'une ardente 
obligation. Mais il faut aussi, pour qu'une culture demeure vivante et ne se limite pas a etre un musee, un 
conservatoire du passe, la nourrir d'une creation nouvelle et continue. A cet effet, il ne suffit pas 
d'encourager la creation individuelle. 11 faut encore multiplier les occasions de faire mieux se connaitre nos 
createurs et nos chercheurs, non pas dans des rencontres ephemeres et formelles, mais en faisant en sorte que 
puisse s'etablir entre eux un veritable brassage, aboutissant a des travaux communs, voire a des creations 
collectives, comme l' orchestre des j eunes de la Communaute nous en donne un exemple. 




















La permeabilite qui prevalait au Moyen-Age et a la Renaissance entre les Universites et les Centres de 
creation doit a cet egard nous servir de modele. Ces echanges culturels en profondeur ne doivent pas toucher 
seulement nos citoyens au cours de leur vie scolaire et universitaire, mais se poursuivre tout au long de leur 
existence active. Les difficulte a resoudre pour atteindre un tel obj ectif ne sont pas minces, mais l 'enj eu est 
fondamental. Nous devons plus hardiment que par le passe aller de l'avant dans cette voie. 
( ... ) 
Beaucoup d'initiatives sont possibles dans un domaine aussi diversifie que celui de la culture. 11 est important 
en tout cas qu'une reflexion europeenne se developpe a ce sujet, et le Parlement elu entend y contribuer de 
fa;:on dynamique. J'en veux pour preuve les travaux engages par sa Commission chargee de la culture, ( ... ), 
notamment en vue de !'harmonisation des legislations nationales sur la sauvegarde du patrimoine. 11 me parait 
tout aussi essentiel que cette reflexion n'en reste pas au stade des idees genereuses, mais se traduise dans les 
faits. Je dirais a cet egard que nous avons deux ecueils a eviter. 
L'un consisterait a vouloir faire du projet culturel europeen un projet en soi, autonome par rapport a la vie 
economique et sociale de la Communaute. Un tel projet se revelerait vite manquer de substance, car les 
cultures europeennes n'existent que dans la realite vecue. C'est pourquoi une politique culturelle ne saurait 
prendre corps que par des actions concretes repondant a des objectifs precis. 
L'autre serait de tarir toute initiative europeenne en matiere culturelle pour des raisons institutionnelles, liees 
aux competences respectives de la Communaute et des Etats. Je dirais qu'a mon sens la question ne se pose 
pas en ces termes; la culture est en effet indetachable de toute activite et de toute expression humaine, au 
point qu'on ne peut imaginer que, par une dichotomie artificielle, on ecarte la dimension culturelle de la vie 
communautaire. 
Cependant, il nous faut certainement lutter pour promouvoir un nouvel esprit europeen, qui devrait nous 
permettre en fin de compte de nous situer, les yeux resolument tournes vers l'avenir, dans notre specificite et 
dans nos rapports avec les autres expressions de la civilisation humaine, nous ne devons pas perdre de vue 
qu'une des caracteristiques de notre humanisme, c'est l'acceptation de la diversite. 
A cet egard, j'observe que loin de disparaitre, l'attachement a des fai;:ons d'etre specifiques, nationales, 
regionales, parfois meme plus strictement locales, se manifeste avec de plus en plus de vigueur. 
Partout dans notre Communaute, cet attachement renouvele a un cadre local, a la mesure de l 'homme, a les 
memes causes. 11 s'agit d'abord d'une resistance aux conditions de l'existence modeme et a l'uniformisation 
du cadre de vie qu'entrainent les techniques actuelles. Les hommes et les femmes de nos pays, soumis a des 
pressions considerables et permanentes, dans leur travail par l'imperatif de la productivite, dans leurs foyers 
par l'intermediaire des medias, tendent a devenir des atomes indistincts et interchangeables. Ils trouvent 
done, dans l'attachement a des valeurs traditionnelles, proches d'eux et qui les distinguent par leur specificite, 
un contrepoids a ces pressions. 
11 faut aussi voir, dans ce phenomene, un aspect de l'aspiration democratique proprement dite. Un peu 
partout, en effet, le citoyen, deconcerte par la distance qui le separe des centres de decision, souhaite plus de 
participation, une democratie plus directe, plus proche des lieux ou se deroulent sa vie et ses activites. 
La construction europeenne, non seulement n'est pas en contradiction avec ces aspirations nouvelles, mais 
constitue a mes yeux le meilleur moyen de les realiser. 
D'une part, en garantissant notre force, la Communaute permet et permettra, d'autant mieux qu'elle sera plus 
solidaire, l'epanouissement des particularismes. D'autre part, en retour, tout ce qui nous distingue, sans 
cependant nous opposer sur l'essentiel, doit nourrir notre progression vers une societe moins nivelee, riche en 
potentialites diverses. Nous unir, ce n'est pas perdre nos identites, c'est nous engager sur un chemin qui nous 
permette de les conserver et de les enrichir. 
Retrouver et vivifier l'identite europeenne me parait etre une necessite pour que nos citoyens comprennent 




















mieux qu'aujourd'hui, pourquoi la Communaute est indispensable a notre avenir. Elle constitue non 
seulement la garantie de cet avenir, mais le moyen de le construire de maniere conforme aux aspirations des 
Europeens. 
C'est cette identite europeenne retrouvee, approfondie, qui donnera une dimension supplementaire, humaine -
je dirais spirituelle - a l'appartenance a la Communaute europeenne des hommes et des femmes de nos pays. 
( ... ) 
Au-dela des Europeens eux-memes, nous devons d'ailleurs demeurer conscients que notre Europe a des 
devoirs a I' egard du reste du monde, du moins a I' egard de tous ceux qui, a travers le monde, aspirent a la 
prosperite, a la <lignite, a la liberte. Si nous devons, a !'evidence, resister a la tentation de nous poser en 
modele et d'imposer nos schemas economiques, politiques ou culturels, nous devons aussi continuer d'aider 
Jes pays en voie de developpement. Ils ont besoin de nous et nous avons - et aurons plus encore dans l'avenir, 
besoin d'eux. II serait nefaste a nos interets bien compris que la crise qui frappe nos economies nous detourne 
de cette tiiche, que je considere comme prioritaire. 
De meme, nous ne devons pas cesser de defendre Jes droits de l 'homme partout ou ils sont bafoues. La 
encore, ii convient de reflechir avant de nous poser en donneurs de leyons. Nos conceptions, qui tiennent a 
notre histoire, a notre civilisation, a I' etat de developpement economique et social que nous avons atteint, ne 
sont pas toujours transposables et peuvent susciter de legitimes resistances. Nous ne devons pas perdre de 
vue, en outre, que Jes formes concretes que doit revetir la defense des droits de l'homme sont liees a la 
specificite de chacune des diverses evolutions sociologiques, techniques et economiques qui se developpent 
ici et la a travers le monde. 
Mais ce qui est permanent c'est, me semble-t-il, !'exigence de la defense de la personne, contre tout ce qui 
aboutit a la reduire, a la niveler, a l'asservir; c'est la sauvegarde de l'individu dans son integrite, dans son 
irreductible identite. 
Les Europeens n'ont pas toujours une conscience exacte de l'esperance que constitue a travers le monde, pour 
des millions d'hommes, la Communaute Europeenne, en Europe meme, a nos frontieres de l'Est, comme en 
Afrique, en Amerique, en Asie. Si nous echouions a mener a bien la tiiche historique fondamentale qu'est 
!'Union europeenne, ce n'est pas seulement nous-memes que nous trahirions, ce sont aussi tous ces hommes 
qui regardent vers nous avec espoir et confiance. 
( ... ) 




















10- Une Puissance au service de l'ordre international 
Dans un monde ou l'interdependance des economies nationales est devenu une banalite, 
l'Europe communautaire peut-elle servir de modele pour !'elaboration d'un nouvel ordre 
mondial ? Oui, repond le president de la Commission europeenne, Jacques Delors, lors 
d'un Forum organise, le 7 septembre 1992 a Landres, par la Presidence britannique du 
Conseil des ministres. 
• • • 
11 nous faut, pour resister aux forces de la fragmentation, du protectionnisme et de !'exclusion, passer du seul 
constat de l'interdependance a la gestion de celle-ci, en vue d'objectifs et selon des regles acceptes en 
commun. La Communaute europeenne, nee dans un contexte tres different, fait d'hostilite et 
d'incomprehension, peut-elle foumir aujourd'hui des lignes de reference pour !'elaboration de ce nouvel ordre. 
Elle est sans doute la plus longue experience de gestion des interdependances, dans un cadre commun et sans 
hegemonie d'une nation -une experience qui a ses limites, mais qui reste vivante et continue de s'enrichir. A ce 
titre, elle vaut certainement d'etre observee lorsqu'on parle de nouvel ordre mondial, memes si Jes principes 
qui la gouvement ne sont pas toujours reproductibles. 
Ecartons d'emblee une objection que certains ont longtemps jugee majeure, mais qui ne resiste plus guere a 
!'analyse : c'est l'image de la Communaute europeenne comme bloc economique, comme forteresse. Au 
contraire des tentatives d'autosuffisance regionale des annees 30, la Communaute europeenne s'est averee 
depuis longtemps un facteur d'expansion du commerce international, et meme de la plus grande liberalisation 
de celui-ci. Nos partenaires sont progressivement gagnes a l'idee que !'integration regionale est un facteur de 
dynamisme pour tous et !'experience europeenne en inspire desormais beaucoup -la recente conclusion des 
accords entre les Etats-Unis, le Canada et le Mexique en temoigne. 
Cette objection etant ecartee, concentrons-nous sur ce qui me parait le plus interessant pour notre sujet : les 
principes qui gouvement la Communaute, et leur interet pour la construction d'un nouvel ordre. Trente-cinq 
ans apres sa creation, je crois, en effet, qu'il n'est pas presomptueux de dire que la Communaute europeenne 
conserve un petit cote revolutionnaire, qu'elle reste une sorte de "laboratoire" de la gestion des 
interdependances. Quels sont, en effet, ces principes ? J'en distinguerai quatre. 
Premier principe qui, avec l'anesthesie de notre memoire collective, peut sembler bien lointain : l'echange et la 
cooperation entre Jes peuples. A l'heure ou la haine, ou simplement !'ignorance et la peur de l'autre agitent la 
partie de l'Europe qui sort de la nuit totalitaire, ne minimisons pas notre reconnaissance aux hommes et aux 
femmes reunis au Congres de La Haye -au premier rang desquels Sir Winston Churchill- qui, en 1948, ont 
choisi d'aller a l'encontre des idees de revanche, de la mefiance congenitale entre les peuples. Ils ont su refuser 
ce que l'on a pour habitude d'appeler la "paix des vainqueurs", celle de bien des Traites d'apres-guerre, ou le 
drame de la future guerre est toujours inscrit dans le reglement de la paix precedente, ou l'on cherche a 
satisfaire d'abord instincts de puissance et interets immediats. Les peres fondateurs de l'Europe ont su 
embarquer nos pays dans un engrenage de solidarites et de cooperations qui semble rendre impossible le 
retour aux vieux demons. Nos peuples ont appris a se connaitre, a dialoguer, a s'apprecier; c'est la cle de tout; 
elle n'exclut evidemment pas les differends et les contentieux, mais la volonte existe, en demier ressort, de 
trouver des compromis positifs. 
Deuxieme principe : la maitrise de l'interdependance economique. Elle connait, dans la Communaute, trois 




















visages. D'abord la competition, qui stimule. La perspective du marche unique, largement anticipee par les 
entreprises, a reveille des economies nationales qui etaient sur la voie du declin relatif ; les mentalites 
changent, les conditions sont posees d'une plus grande concurrence, d'une plus grande ouverture sur 
l'exterieur. Ensuite, la cooperation, qui renforce : c'est, par exemple, la politique de recherche, qui devra etre 
plus proche de nos entreprises, ce sont les actions de formation et de reconversion professionnelles dans les 
secteurs qui font face a de profondes mutations industrielles, ou encore le developpement des reseaux 
d'infrastructure. Enfin, la solidarite, qui rapproche : c'est notamment la politique de cohesion economique et 
sociale, qui veut donner a chaque region sa chance et permet d'enclencher une logique de croissance qui 
beneficie a tous. Competition, cooperation, solidarite : voila les trois axes indissociables de !'organisation 
de l'espace europeen, de la gestion des interdependances sur le continent. En d'autres termes, unjeu a sommes 
positives. 
Troisieme principe : !'importance du droit, qui permet que les regles du jeu soient acceptees par tous, evitant 
ainsi le diktat et l'hegemonie d'un Etat sur les autres. Chaque pays membre, quelle que soit sa taille ou sa 
force, peut dire son mot et apporter sa pierre a !'edifice commun. La Communaute europeenne est une 
communaute de droit, ou la Cour de justice joue un role essentiel, ou l'un des devoirs de la Commission est 
precisement de faire appliquer par tous la regle du jeu. D'ou la naissance d'un espace politique assez 
inclassable, avec des souverainetes qui sont, selon les cas, limitees, concurrentes ou conjuguees. Et c'est bien 
le respect de la regle de droit qui autorise la gestion commune, en confiance et dans la transparence. 
Enfin, quatrieme principe : la necessite d'un processus efficace de decision. C'est l'idee que sans institutions 
fortes, la seule volonte de cooperer n'est pas suffisante. 




















Lors de sa reunion des 21 /22 juin 1993 a Copenhague, le Conseil europeen 
confirme, dans ses Conclusions, sa volonte de voir la Communaute oeuvrer de maniere 
active afin d'assurer le succes des negociations commerciales de !'Uruguay Round. 
• • • 
Le Conseil europeen se felicite du rapport presente par la Commission sur les progres accomplis a ce jour 
clans les negociations de !'Uruguay Round. 11 a souligne la necessite pour la Communaute de continuer a 
jouer un role actif clans la poursuite des travaux tout en preservant l'identite europeenne tout au long des 
negociations. 
Le Conseil europeen a souligne qu'il importait de relancer le processus multilateral a Geneve aussitot que 
possible sur tous les sujets, y compris !'agriculture, afin d'obtenir d'ici la fin de l'annee un accord global, 
durable et equilibre. 11 est urgent d'y parvenir pour pouvoir mettre en place un nouveau systeme commercial 
mondial fonde sur des regles, dans lequel le recours a des actions unilaterales soit evite. Des negociations 
conclues sur cette base favoriseront !'expansion durable des echanges internationaux, qui est un element cle 
permettant de promouvoir la croissance economique et la creation d'emplois en Europe et dans le monde. 




















A !'occasion de la Conference de Nations Unies sur !'Environnement et le Developpement, 
au mois de juin 1992, la Commission europeenne publiait un rapport dans lequel elle 
plaidait pour !'adoption de politiques dont le but serait le developpement durable et 
capables de garantir la qualite de vie des generations presentes et futures dans une 
approche globale et multidisciplinaire. 
• • • 
La Communaute Europeenne reconnalt que les preoccupations environnementales representent non seulement 
une priorite mais qu'elles sont aussi indissociables de la plupart des autres domaines d'action. Des lors, la 
Communaute a du adopter une approche globale dans !'elaboration de sa politique environnementale et 
assume la responsabilite d'actions europeennes se double aujourd'hui d'une reflexion et d'actions sur les 
problemes globaux. 
Ce sont les chefs d'Etat de la Communaute qui ont donne le veritable elan a la creation de l'arsenal legislatif 
actuel en matiere d'environnement lors de leur rencontre a Paris en 1972, quelques mois apres la Conference 
de Stockholm. Ils ont reconnu que l'expansion economique n'etait pas une fin en soi et qu'elle devait "se 
traduire par une amelioration de la qualite aussi bien que du niveau de vie et que particuliere attention 
devait etre portee aux valeurs non materielles et a la protection de l'environnement". 
Le premier programme d'action de la Communaute en matiere d'environnement a done ete adopte en 1973 et 
ses principes de base ont ete repris en 1987 dans les amendements au Traite de Rome. L'article 130r para 2 de 
l'Acte unique europeen prevoit que: "l'action de la Communaute en matiere d'environnement est fondee sur Jes 
principes de l'action preventive, de la correction par priorite a la source des atteintes a l'environnement et 
du pollueur-payeur. Les exigences en matiere de protection de l'environnement sont une composante des 
autres politiques de la Communaute". 
L'objectif de Traite tel que modifie par l'Acte unique europeen, l'etablissement d'un marche unique, est lui-
meme conditionne par l'obligation de prendre comme base un haut niveau de protection de 
l'environnement dans !'elaboration des mesures necessaires a sa mise en oeuvre. Le Traite exige, de plus, que 
la Communaute poursuive des objectifs environnementaux comme une fin en soi afin de: 
• "preserver, proteger et ameliorer la qualite de l'environnement, 
• contribuer a la protection de la sante humaine, 
• d'assurer une utilisation prudente et rationnelle des ressources naturelles". 
Le nouveau Traite sur l'Union europeenne, signe par tous les Etats membres de la Communaute le 7 fevrier 
1992, elargit les objectifs de la politique de la Communaute en matiere d'environnement en y ajoutant 
l'objectif de la croissance durable et la solution des problemes globaux. Le Traite, tel que modifie par 
l'Acte unique europeen, formule egalement le principe de la subsidiarite. 11 prevoit en effet que la 
Communaute agit en matiere d'environnement dans la mesure ou les objectifs susmentionnes peuvent etre 
mieux realises au niveau communautaire qu'au niveau des Etats membres pris isolement. Le nouveau Traite 
sur l'Union europeenne attache egalement une valeur particuliere au principe de subsidiarite et stipule que 
les decisions devraient etre prises au plus pres des interets du citoyen. 
La Communaute dispose aujourd'hui d'un large cadre legislatif et reglementaire en la matiere et participe a de 
nombreux Accords et Conventions internationaux. Mais l'approche traditionnelle qui consiste a arreter des 
regles et a en controler le respect, a montre ses limites. Le defi est maintenant d'assurer que la discipline 
necessaire a Un developpement durable est acceptee OU imposee a tOUS les secteurs d'activites importants 
du point de vue de l'environnement ( ... ). 
Le cinquieme programme communautaire pour l'environnement aura pour but le developpement durable et 




















adoptera une demarche d'integration. A cette fin, il mettra en place un plus grand nombre d'instruments tels 
que !'utilisation accrue d'instruments economiques et fiscaux. 
Cependant les notions meme de croissance et de developpement qui sont a la base de nos systemes 
economiques sont en pleine evolution. 
Nous devons tous repondre au defi de la recherche de politiques capables de garantir la qualite de vie 
des generations presentes et futures dans une approche globale et multidisciplinaire. 
La Communaute reconnait qu'en vue de la croissante interdependance de toutes les regions et nations du 
monde pour la realisation d'un developpement durable, chacun doit contribuer aux efforts, tant le 
Nord que la Sud, tant l'Est que l'Ouest. 
Beaucoup de creativite et d'ingeniosite seront necessaires pour stimuler les developpements socio-
economiques qui devront servir a la fois les pays en developpement et les pays developpes pour les 
generations a venir. Ceci pourrait necessiter un changement radical de nos styles de vie et nos modes de 
consommation. 
La Communaute europeenne contribuera a poursuivre les objectifs du developpement durable, par la 
meilleure utilisation de tous les instruments disponibles au niveau multilateral tant qu'au niveau bilateral et 
cherchera a realiser au niveau global et au niveau regional l'equilibre entre les generations presentes ainsi 
qu'entre ces memes generations et celles qui en seront issues. 




















Dans une communication redigee en prevision de la Conference mondiale sur la population 
et le developpement organises sous l'egide des Nations Unies et qui devait se tenir du 5 au 
13 septembre 1994 au Caire, la Commission affirme la necessite de prendre des mesures 
"ni coercitives, ni discriminatoires" pour "eviter une explosion demographique 
incontrolable". 
• • • 
La Conference du Caire se tient a un moment-cle. C'est maintenant, en cette fin du XXeme siecle, qu'il faut 
agir pour eviter une explosion demographique incontrolable, qui mettrait en peril le developpement de 
nombreux pays et regions, qui donnerait naissance a des mouvements migratoires importants et 
potentiellement destabilisateurs, et qui poserait d'inextricables problemes d'environnement, au plan local et 
global. Des progres ont deja ete enregistres: les taux de croissance demographique ont baisse depuis vingt ans, 
souvent sous l'effet de politiques de population dont on cerne maintenant les conditions du succes. 11 faut 
biitir sur ces progres, pour engager ou renforcer de telles politiques, en profitant du climat de consensus qui 
existe actuellement dans la plupart des pays, et au sein de la communaute internationale, a cet egard. 
A ces politiques, ni coercitives, ni discriminatoires, et adaptees aux differentes situations culturelles, tous 
peuvent et doivent contribuer. Si la responsabilite premiere de leur conception et de leur mise en oeuvre 
appartient aux PVD eux-memes, les pays industrialises ont un role important a jouer, en apportant 
notamment un appui technique et des complements indispensables de financement. 
La Communaute europeenne devra oeuvrer au succes de la Conference, qui devrait deboucher sur un 
programme d'action ambitieux pour la prochaine decennie. Elle doit se declarer prete a prendre des 
engagements chiffres, en vue d'un accroissement substantiel de son soutien financier aux programmes de 
population dans les pays en developpement. 
Source: "La Communaute europeenne devant le defi de la croissance demoqraphique: position a prendre par la 
Communaute a la Conference mondiale sur la population et developpement, le Caire, 5-13 septembre l 994: 
COM(94) l 00 final du 4.5.1994 




















A !'occasion de la tenue du Sammet Mondial pour le Developpement Social organise sous 
l'egide des Nations Unies en mars 1995 a Copenhague, la Commission europeenne a 
reaffirme son attachement a "un developpement centre sur !'Homme". 
• • • 
Le Sommet Mondial pour le Developpement Social doit donner un sens a la mondialisation de l'economie en 
lui assignant pour objectif un developpement centre sur l'Homme et fonde sur un ensemble de principes 
et de regles commons a tous les continents et a tous les pays de maniere a prevenir tout risque de 
confrontation et a assurer un maximum d'echanges et de cooperation entre eux. Les politiques nationales 
doivent, dans le cadre d'un ordre international fixant des objectifs et des normes d'equite et de progres 
social, integres dans des politiques de croissance stable et de developpement durable, viser explicitement a 
faire reculer la pauvrete, promouvoir l'emploi productif et assurer !'integration sociale tout en preservant 
l'environnement. 
Au plan national la pauvrete et !'exclusion doivent tout d'abord etre prevenues et combattues en assurant un 
acces effectif et equitable de toutes et de tous aux ressources productives et aux marches ainsi qu'a un 
systeme de protection sociale minimum. Mais !'eradication de la pauvrete et !'integration sociale appellent 
en plus une action systematique portant sur leurs causes profondes: la participation fondee sur la 
democratie et les droits de l'Homme, y compris l'egalite entre hommes et femmes, la couverture des besoins 
primaires en logements salubres, en nourriture et en sante grace a la solidarite de toute la societe, !'education 
et la formation, forment aussi les axes de base de cette action. En outre, l'action des associations volontaires 
proches des gens doit etre soutenue par l'Etat et par les pouvoirs regionaux et locaux. 
Au plan international le respect de la democratie et des droits de l'Homme doit etre etendu et assure tandis que 
la negociation multilaterale de normes sociales doit etre encouragees notamment a l'OIT et a l'ECOSOC; 
ces normes doivent etre integrees dans les politiques conduites par les organes et agences specialisees des 
Nations Unies, par l'OMC, le FMI et la Banque Mondiale, lesquelles doivent se fixer egalement des objectifs 
explicites et concrets de developpement humain. 
L'aide bilaterale et multilaterale allant a des programmes sociaux doit etre renforcee de maniere a soutenir 
les transferts necessaires de ressources internes vers le developpement humain, notamment a l'interieur des 
budgets publics. 
Le monitoring des politiques nationales et de la cooperation doivent etre assures de maniere systematique en 
vue de pouvoir noter des progres substantiels lors du prochain Sommet Social qui devrait se tenir en 2005. 
L'Union europeenne pour sa part, poursuivra, tout en garantissant l'ouverture la plus large de son marche, ses 
efforts pour creer massivement des emplois, prevenir !'exclusion sociale et revitaliser, dans cette perspective, 
ses systemes de protection sociale. Elle entend viser a l'eradication de la pauvrete et a l'integration de 
toutes les composantes de ses societes. 
Enfin, l'Union europeenne premier donneur d'aide au developpement est determinee a continuer a fournir une 
contribution substantielle a l'action internationale, tant en matiere de normes et de conventions 
multilateralement negociees qu'en matiere de cooperation avec ses partenaires en developpement. 
Source: "Priorites de l'Union europeenne au Sammet Mondial pour le Developpement Social", COM(94) 669 final 
du 21.12.1994 




















11 - Une Union ouverte au reste du monde 
Louise Weiss, doyenne du premier Parlement europeen directement elu. 
Discours d'ouverture a Strasbourg. 
• • • 
Les etoiles du destin et les chemins de l'ecriture m'ont menee a cette tribune pour y vivre, Presidente d'un 
jour, un honneur dont je n'aurais pas ose rever, et une joie - la joie la plus forte que puisse eprouver une 
creature au soir de son existence-, la joie d'une vocation de jeunesse miraculeusement accomplie. 
Joumaliste, ecrivain, cineaste, dont l'encre et les images n'ont jamais trahi la foi, il me semble, en cette 
minute, n'avoir traverse le siecle et sillonne le monde que pour venir a votre rencontre en amoureuse de 
l'Europe et pour tacher de formuler avec votre approbation les angoisses et les esperances qui tourmentent, qui 
soulevent notre conscience collective. 
Nos peuples nous ecoutent, les deux Ameriques, l'Asie, l'Afrique, l'Oceanie nous ecoutent. Ah ! Mes 
merveilleux Europeens ! Sauvegardons ensemble notre bien le plus precieux - a savoir notre culture et notre 
fratemite en cette culture. Je vous demande votre accord, your agreement, Ihre Zustimmung, ii vostro 
consenso, Uw akkoord, Deres tilslutning, comhaontit. 
Que cette joumee historique ne s'acheve pas sans qu'une flamme nouvelle ait brille au ciel de notre 
civilisation en travail de rajeunissement et que cette flamme, ce soit vous qui l'ayez allumee ici a Strasbourg, 
la metropole symbolique de la reconciliation continentale. 
D'abord ! D'abord, gardons un sentiment juste de nos personnes placees aujourd'hui, dans l'univers, a la 
chamiere de la mutation pathetique de l'ere de l'acier en ere de l'atome et, en notre petit cap de l' Asie, a la 
chamiere de la mutation dechirante de nos societes de surconsommation en societes de types nouveaux 
obligees de compter avec les imperatifs contradictoires de la natalite et des loisirs, des emplois, de la securite 
et du manque eventuel de matieres premieres. lei, nos manettes et nos cadrans se sont substitues a la peine 
des hommes. Ailleurs, ceux-ci vegetent encore au sein de societes de subsistance ou pire, de penurie. En 
depit des menaces de tous ordres qui pesent sur elle, l'Europe se doit de continuer a aider les desherites de ce 
monde. Tel est encore un fardeau. En tous les cas, que jamais ne nous abandonne le sentiment d'etre des 
legataires et des testateurs: les legataires d'une spiritualite essentielle et les testateurs de cette spiritualite au 
benefice des generations a venir. 




















Le 12 juin 1985, lors de la ceremonie organisee pour la signature du traite d'adhesion de 
l'Espagne a la Communaute europeenne, le president du gouvernement espagnol 
pronorn;:a un discours dans lequel ii evoquait a la fois les attentes de son pays vis a vis de 
cette adhesion et ce que l'Espagne apporterait a la Communaute europeenne. 
• • • 
"Nosotros entendemos que la unidad europea no puede hacerse solo hacia dentro, sino tambien hacia fuera. El 
ser hist6rico de Europa consiste, precisamente, en volcarse hacia el mundo. Todo intento de construir una 
Europa cerrada en si misma estaria condenado al fracaso, ademas de no servir a los autenticos intereses 
europeos. 
Espana entiende bien la universalidad de Europa porque a su identidad europea une una dimension 
iberoamericana y una dimension mediterranea. 
El ingreso de Espana en la Comunidad Europea es un proyecto ambicioso de largo alcance que desborda 
sobradamente el ambito estricto de !as clausulas del Tratado que acabamos de suscribir. 
Para Espana, este hecho significa la culminacion de un proceso de superaci6n de nuestro aislamiento secular 
y la participaci6n en un destino commun con el resto de los paises de Europa occidental. 
Para nuestra realidad econ6mica y social, supone sin duda un desafio de modernidad, que exige un cambio 
de mentalidad y de estructuras. Sera un esfuerzo de adaptaci6n aun mayor que el hecho en su dia por los 
paises fundadores de la Europa comunitaria, porque nos sumamos con retraso a un proceso ya en marcha. 
Tengo confianza, sin embargo, en que a ese desafio va a responder claramente nuestra sociedad: 
profesionales, tecnicos e investigadores, hombres y mujeres de todos pueblos de Espana. Con el esfuerzo de 
todos y la ilusi6n de un pueblo dinamico y joven, podremos afrontar el reto de la modernizacion 
economica, social y tecnologica que nos permitira cruzar con confianza y paso firme el umbra! de la pr6xima 
centuria". 




















En juin 1992, la Commission europeenne transmet au Conseil europeen, qui se reunit a 
Lisbonne, son rapport sur les criteres et conditions pour !'adhesion de nouveaux membres 
a la Communaute. Elle n'y dissimule pas les difficultes, mais son raisonnement est domine 
par un evident souci d'ouverture. 
• • • 
La division engendree par la guerre froide a vecu et les pays concemes se sont engages sur la voie des 
reformes democratiques et economiques. L'integration de ces nouvelles democraties dans la famille 
europeenne est une chance historique. L'elargissement de la Communaute, jadis realise dans un continent 
divise, peut contribuer demain a !'unification de !'Europe toute entiere. La Communaute n'a jamais ete un 
cercle ferme et ne peut auj ourd'hui eluder le defi de l'histoire qui exige d'elle qu'elle assume ses 
responsabilites continentales et contribue a la mise en place d'un ordre politique et economique pour 
!'Europe toute entiere. 
( ... ) 
L'elargissement constitue un defi que la Communaute ne peut esquiver. Les autres pays d'Europe s'attendent 
a ce que nous soyons les garants de la stabilite, de la paix et de la prosperite, et ils comptent sur nous pour 
leur donner un role dans !'integration de !'Europe. Pour les nouvelles democraties, !'Europe reste un symbole 
eclatant des valeurs fondamentales et des aspirations que leurs peuples ont gardees en memoire pendant leurs 
longues annees d'oppression. Consolider leur liberte nouvelle retrouvee et stabiliser leur developpement n'est 
pas seulement dans leur inten~t, mais egalement dans le notre. 
Nous devons repondre ace defi par une strategie inspiree non seulement par des considerations pratiques sur 
ce qu'il est possible de realiser dans un proche avenir, mais egalement par une vision a long terme de l'Europe 
elargie. C'est la raison pour laquelle la Commission propose comme strategie d'ouvrir prochainement des 
negociations avec les pays qui sont disposes a adherer et en mesure de le faire, et de preparer activement la 
voie pour les autres pays qui se presenteront plus tard. 




















Lors de sa session des 21/22 juin 1993 a Copenhague, le Conseil europeen prend la 
decision de principe que les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale qui le souhaitent pourront 
devenir membres de !'Union europeenne. Les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement precisent 
les conditions qui devront etre remplies pour proceder a cet elargissement, mais affirment 
aussi leur volonte de soutenir concretement les efforts que les pays candidats auront a 
consentir sur la voie de !'adhesion. 
• • • 
i) Le Conseil europeen a procede a des discussions approfondies sur les relations entre la Communaute et les 
pays d'Europe centrale et orientale avec lesquels la Communaute a conclu ou envisage de conclure des 
accords europeens ("pays associes") ( ... ). 
ii) Le Conseil europeen se felicite des efforts courageux entrepris par les pays associes pour moderniser leurs 
economies affaiblies par quarante ans de planification centralisee et pour assurer une transition rapide vers 
une economie de marche. La Communaute et ses Etats membres promettent leur soutien a ce processus de 
reforme. La paix et la securite en Europe dependent du succes de ces efforts. 
iii) Le Conseil europeen est convenu aujourd'hui que les pays associes de l'Europe centrale et orientale qui le 
desirent pourront devenir membres de l'Union europeenne. L'adhesion aura lieu des que le pays membre 
associe sera en mesure de remplir les obligations qui en decoulent, en remplissant les conditions 
economiques et politiques requises. 
L'adhesion requiert de la part du pays candidat qu'il ait des institutions stables garantissant la democratie, la 
primaute du droit, les droits de l 'Homme, le respect des minorites et leur protection, l'existence d'une 
economie de marche viable ainsi que la capacite de faire face a la pression concurrentielle et aux forces du 
marche a l'interieur de l'Union. L'adhesion presuppose la capacite du pays candidat a en assumer les 
obligations, et notamment de souscrire aux objectifs de l'union politique, economique et monetaire. 
La capacite de l'Union a assimiler de nouveaux membres tout en maintenant l'elan de l'integration europeenne 
constitue egalement un element important repondant a l'interet general aussi bien de l'Union que des pays 
candidats. ( ... ) 
iv) Le Conseil europeen est convenu que la cooperation future avec les pays associes sera orientee vers 
l'objectif d'adhesion qui a ete fixe a present. A cet egard, le Conseil europeen a approuve ce qui suit: 
• La Communaute propose que les pays associes etablissent des relations structurees avec les 
institutions de l'Union dans le cadre d'un dialogue multilateral renforce et etendu et d'une concertation 
sur les questions d'interet common.( ... ) 
• Le Conseil europeen, reconnaissant l'importance cruciale des echanges dans la transition vers une 
economie de marche, convient d'accelerer les efforts entrepris par la Communaute pour ouvrir ses 
marches. 11 espere que cette nouvelle initiative ira de pair avec un developpement accru des echanges 
entre ces pays eux-memes et entre ceux-ci et leurs partenaires commerciaux traditionnels. ( ... ) 
• La Communaute continuera a consacrer une part considerable des ressources budgetaires allouees aux 
actions exterieures aux pays d'Europe centrale et orientate, notamment par le biais du programme 
Phare. La Communaute exploitera pleinement les possibilites prevues au titre du mecanisme 
temporaire de pret de la BEi pour financer des projets de reseaux transeuropeens impliquant les pays 
d'Europe centrale et orientate. Le cas echeant, une partie des ressources au titre du programme Phare 
pourra etre utilisee en vue d'apporter des ameliorations importantes aux infrastructures( ... ). 
Le Conseil europeen, se felicitant des possibilites offertes aux pays associes de participer aux programmes 
communautaires au titre des accords europeens, a invite la Commission a faire des propositions d'ici a la fin 
de l'annee pour ouvrir de nouveaux programmes aux pays associes, en prenant comme point de depart les 
programmes auxquels peuvent deja participer les pays de l'AELE. 




















Le 21 novembre 1994, le premier ministre finlandais, Esko Aho, participait a un seminaire 
a Edimbourg dans lequel ii exposa les raisons qui poussaient son pays a vouloir devenir 
membre de l'Union europeenne. 
• • • 
"New members are expected to inject new life into the Union's doings. This is most natural. When the 
Union enlarges, it changes. New members will bring their special characteristics, their values, their 
history, their goals with them. 
( ... ) I am convinced that Finland, together with the other Nordic Member States, will further strengthen the 
basic democratic structures and values of the Union. The Nordic societies are characterised by a very 
strong democratic tradition. Subsidiarity, in the sense of the Maastricht Treaty, is engrained in our system of 
government. We take pride in our high standards of social welfare, equality between men and women and 
openness of our political procedures. 
For reasons of geography and climate, we have through centuries learned to respect and conserve the 
sensitive northern and Arctic nature. Our prosperity is based on forests and other renewable resources. 
Because of that we have a basic interest to promote ecologically sound answers to the economic challenges 
we face. 
For this same reason, we will seek to develop the Union's environmental policies and promote such 
technological developments that meet the test of sustainability. 
( ... ) Today, Finland is technologically very advanced. To survive and compete, we have had to make use of 
the latest innovations of scientific research. Perhaps the best example of this is offered by the 
telecommunications technology. 
In a large, sparsely-populated country, we need ways to overcome the handicap of distance. This also explains 
why - for the sake of efficiency - we have been among the first in the world to deregulate our 
telecommunications systems and to develop the most advanced technologies". 




















Le rapport "Preparer !'Europe du XXleme siecle" est, le 1 O mai 1995, la premiere 
contribution de la Commission europeenne a la preparation de la Conference 
intergouvernementale de 1996. Elle y souligne que celle-ci devra travailler a la lumiere des 
elargissements de l'Union qui se profilent et des defis qu'ils representent. Sans nier les 
difficultes, elle invite a les transcender. 
• • • 
C'est d'abord aux portes de l'Union europeenne elle-meme que l'ebranlement historique de 1989 s'est 
prolonge. Les bouleversements issus de la chute du mur de Berlin ont porte leurs fruits. Au prix d'efforts 
remarquables, les nouvelles democraties du centre et de l'est de l'Europe ont confirme leur attachement aux 
valeurs qui fondent l'Union elle-meme. A son tour, l'Union s'est engagee ales integrer. 
De la nait un deuxieme enjeu majeur : celui d'accueillir au sein de l'Union ces pays tout en preservant les 
acquis de quarante ans de construction europeenne. En d'autres termes : comment faire en sorte que 
l'elargissement ne soit pas !'addition de nos faiblesses, mais la conjugaison de nos forces ? Comment 
ameliorer nos capacites a decider et a agir alors que s'accentuent nos diversites ? L'elargissement doit 
constituer un contrat nouveau passe dans la lucidite. Nous devons etre conscients des implications de 
l'elargissement sur les institutions et les politiques de l'Union. La Commission est persuadee que ces 
questions trouveront une reponse. 11 n'y a pas de fatalite ace qu'un mouvement fonde sur l'esprit d'ouverture 
et de solidarite se traduise par l'affaiblissement et la dilution : elargissement et approfondissement sont 
parfaitement compatibles. 




















Les 27/28 novembre 1995, Barcelone heberge la Conference euro-mediterraneenne qui 
reunit les quinze Etats membres de !'Union europeenne et leurs douze partenaires du 
bassin mediterraneen. Le vice-president de la Commission Manuel Marin y salue le 
lancement d'un partenariat euro-mediterraneen qui marque le passage a une ere nouvelle 
de cooperation. 
• • • 
As fate would have it, this Conference is being held on the day when, exactly 900 hundred years ago, on 27 
November 1095, Pope Urban II announced the first crusade. 
It is nine centuries to the day since the Council of Clermont, and now Barcelona has the opportunity of 
becoming the symbol of a new era. 
That far-off day was something more than a wretched example of intolerance : it was the beginning of a long 
history of war, misunderstanding and crisis between civilisations. Differences and tensions have persisted and 
accumulated and many open wounds remain. 
Yet at the same time, history has provided us with a consistent image of the Mediterranean as a cultural 
melting-pot, a symbol of the fruitful cross-exchange of civilisations. This cultural and historical heritage a 
shared dimension of the Mediterranean people, is a means of asserting identity, but also of achieving mutual 
comprehension. I'll therefore feel deeply honoured to be able to take part today, on behalf of the European 
Commission, in the first Conference which brings together the European Union and its Mediterranean 
partners. 
The plan for a Euro-Mediterranean Association is today becoming reality. I welcome the fact that this new 
multilateral approach, the aim of which is to promote peace, security and prosperity in the Mediterranean 
region has been given the support of all the partners present here today. 
The Barcelona Conference is the start of a process, the beginning of a dialogue which will develop on the 
political, economic, social, cultural and human fronts with ambitious and practical objectives. 
The establishment of a stability pact, the harmonisation of legislation allowing the free movement of goods or 
the preservation of the Mediterranean environmental heritage are other examples of projects which can be 
achieved only by involving all the parties concerned and ensuring resolute political will. 
The Euro-Mediterranean Association breaks new ground because it involves both ordinary citizens and those 
in charge of shaping economic and social policy. 
It is the best guarantee of accomplishing the Euro-Mediterranean economic space and bringing nations closer 
together. Our Mediterranean partners face a huge challenge. Backing this effort implies consistent support 
from the European Union for economics and administrative reform policies, a significant broadening of the 
scope and instruments of cooperation, and a major financial contribution, which the Cannes European 
Council set at ECU 4.685 million over five years. The very economics of the Euro-Mediterranean project calls 
for this qualitative step forward. Long-term association assumes a mutually beneficial system of economic 
integration which must have the regulatory and support instruments without which it will come to nothing. 
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